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1Abstract
In this paper we examine the links between economic governance, viewed as the
structure and practice of economic policy-making and management, and poverty
elimination efforts.  By examining the qualitative and historical links making up the
economic governance-poverty nexus in South Korea, we extend the line of research
broached by Evans and Rauch (1999) to consider the relation of Korea's capacities for
economic governance to the incidence of poverty and inequality there.
Based primarily on field interviews with past and present officials in the economic and
social bureaucracy, as well as with relevant academics and civil society associations,
this research finds that with democratisation, and particularly during the Kim Young
Sam administration (1993-97), the growing flirtation with neo-liberal economics (for
various reasons and from various sources) resulted in the abandonment of strategic
economic planning, and with it, the further marginalisation of concerns with inequality
and social welfare within the economic bureaucracy.  More specifically, the
restructuring of the economic bureaucracy over the 1990s—first with the demise of the
Economic Planning Board and the subsumption of some of its functions within the
Ministry of Finance and Economy and second with the breakdown of that ministry in
1998—led to a decline in support for progressive, social welfare ideas from within the
economic bureaucracy. While the issues of inequality and welfare forced their way onto
the government's agenda during the economic crisis (as a result of rising
unemployment), this effort was politically driven by the President and was not a
'normal' and thus stable feature of the country's system of economic governance.
Consequently, the future direction that Korea takes with regards to economic
governance and poverty is likely to revolve around the ability for policy-makers and
social welfare advocates to significantly develop the notion of 'productive welfare' (or
other 'third way' notions) through a broad based policy dialogue that can achieve
consensus and support by all those involved in economic governance.
The structure of the paper is as follows: We begin by briefly examining the country's
record on poverty from the 1960s through to the present day. We then turn to examine
the state's institutional capacities for economic governance, detailing the historical
evolution of Korea’s institutions.  This institutional historiography is meant to inform
the penultimate section where we present an analysis of the effects Korea’s system of
economic governance may have had on its poverty reduction efforts in the years
immediately following the Asian Financial Crisis in late 1997.  Finally, we conclude
with some of the general issues that arise from analysis the economic governance-
poverty nexus.
21. INTRODUCTION
In the research linking economic growth to state institutional capacities for economic
governance, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) has emerged as one of the exemplary
cases. Among the factors that have led to its extraordinary growth record since the late
1960s, governance capacities (including bureaucratic competence) seem to have been
decisive (Evans and Rauch 1999, Rauch and Evans 2000). While South Korea's
industrialisation and growth record has not been unique - in that it was matched by
Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong 1 - what was unusual was that from the early 1970s
through to the late 1990s, poverty reduction - verging on elimination - seemed to have
gone hand in hand with economic growth without any significant government
commitment to anti-poverty policies. Along with Taiwan, South Korea appeared to be
the prime example of how poverty could be eliminated merely as a by product of
economic growth and it was internationally touted as such by the World Bank and
similar agencies.2
In this paper we examine the links between economic governance, viewed as the
structure and practice of economic policy making and management, and poverty
elimination efforts.  The line of research broached by Evans and Rauch is extended by
examining the relation of South Korea's capacities for economic governance to the
incidence of poverty and inequality there. We begin by briefly examining the country's
record on poverty from the 1960s through to the present day. We then turn to examine
the state's institutional capacities for economic governance, detailing the historical
evolution of Korea’s institutions.  This institutional historiography informs the
penultimate section where we present an analysis of the effects Korea’s system of
economic governance may have had on its poverty reduction efforts in the years
immediately following the Asian Financial Crisis of late 1997.  In the conclusion we
identify the main issues that arise from this analysis of the economic governance-
poverty nexus.
2. POVERTY RECORD
South Korea has experienced one of the most dramatic declines in absolute poverty that
the world has seen.  In the 1950s the majority of its people lived in absolute poverty.
Even as late as the mid-1960s, between 60-70 percent of the population was estimated
to be living in poverty (PSPD/UNDP 2000).  Hunger and deprivation were widespread
and with much of the country's economy and infrastructure destroyed during the Korean
War (1950-53), it looked as though its population – still largely a peasantry in the 1960s
– would be impoverished for many years to come.  By the mid-1990s, however,
absolute poverty had dramatically declined to levels as low as 3.4 percent of the
population (Park 2001).  Indeed, by 1999, the Korean averages for poverty in single-
person households was comparable to other OECD countries (OECD 2000).  These
                                                
1 Not to mention, in an earlier period, the USSR and Japan.
2 The other East Asian 'tigers', Hong Kong and Singapore, both had indirect anti-poverty policies which
operated in the guise of public housing programmes and in the case of Hong Kong, the 'administered'
control of food prices (Castells et al 1990, Schiffer 1991, Henderson 1993).
3declines in income poverty have been matched by gains in human development. The
average life expectancy of Koreans increased from 55 in 1962 to 72 in 1998; infant
mortality dropped from 7% in 1962 to .9% in 1998 (World Bank, 1999).  By 1998 its
human development index had reached 0.854 and was ranked 31st in the world (UNDP,
2000).
Much of the ‘miracle’ underlying Korea’s historical success in economic growth and
poverty reduction (without explicit poverty reduction policies)3 undoubtedly stem from
both its engagement with land reform in the late 1940s, coupled with its ability to
successfully pursue an export-oriented industrialisation strategy in the mid 1960s
through to the 70s.  The Agricultural Land Reform Amendment Act (ALRAA), brought
into effect in March 1950, directly and indirectly facilitated a vast transfer of arable
land ownership to the peasantry.  Unlike most land reforms, this was an exercise that
genuinely returned ‘land to the tiller.’  It dramatically increased the share of agricultural
value added that was returned to labour and was associated with major improvements in
productivity.  The rural underclass were allowed to repay the loans advances for their
land primarily in terms of a proportion of their annual crop yield.  As the government’s
annual stock of rice was then sold at regulated levels far below market price and these
funds used to pay back the former landlords for their properties, the former landlords
were effectively made to sell their properties for less than their worth thus contributing
to significant levels of income redistribution (Jeon and Kim 2000).4  Alongside land
reform, significant levels of poverty reduction came equally from changes in economic
development strategy under the second five-year economic development plan (1967-
1971).  While having first attempted a development strategy based on “import
substitution” (substituting the import of cement, refined oil, and fertilizer for example
with investment in the production of these items domestically) under President Park
Jung Hee, Korea was able to pursue a different strategy based on “export-oriented
industrialisation” which generated greater levels of economic growth and reinvestment
that, in turn, enabled large numbers of the peasantry to migrate to urban areas and enter
into low paid work as manual labourers.
While the broad picture and basic story concerning the decline in absolute poverty is
clear, the empirical details needed to fully substantiate poverty reduction in Korea are
harder to confirm.  Surprisingly, given the seeming relation of South Korea's economic
'miracle' to poverty reduction, poverty has been regarded as something of a 'non issue'
and has historically received little attention and priority within government or academic
circles.  While the ravages wrought by the country's economic crisis subsequent to 1997
have dramatically raised the profile of the poor in government agencies, even now there
is still no official poverty line nor a consensus on how it should be measured.
The social consequences of the economic crisis of 1997 has raised many concerns.
Amongst these the widespread beliefs that growth would continue and poverty would
decline, have been shaken.  The crisis showed that growth was not guaranteed forever.
                                                
3 As reported in the literature, and as many of our interviewees pointed out, at the microlevel social
security throught the ‘miracle’ was provided by the family unit.
4 Despite concerns that politically dominant regions received preferential treatment, recent research has
confirmed that regional income inequality in Korea has not worsened; an important prerequisite for
assuring that economic growth actually leads to poverty reduction.  For instance, Yoon (2000) has found
that at least during over the 1986–95, available GINI co-efficient data suggests that regional income
distribution has been relatively egalitarian and not distributed across the regions in a distorted manner.
4Those who held steadfast to the assumption that economic growth automatically
reduced poverty, however, continued to believe that this pattern would re-assert itself
when growth returned. When the economy began to grow again in 1999, and reductions
in unemployment and poverty were evident from official statistics, these views seemed
to be substantiated.
Our interviews with those in the relevant Government agencies (October-November
2001) have confirmed that absolute poverty5 has returned to pre-crisis levels (and may
be falling even further). Proponents of the economic 'miracle'/poverty reduction (or
'trickle-down') thesis, however, fail to appreciate that underlying the poverty statistics in
South Korea is an important and longstanding debate about the methods and measures
used to calculate the poverty indices and thus a controversy about the actual levels of
absolute and relative poverty in the country.
The debate around poverty statistics concerns both the nature of the surveys employed
and methods used for calculation. Most researchers use the official Minimum Cost of
Living (MCL) basket to measure poverty.  The MCL is employed by the government as
a working definition of the poverty line for purposes of budgeting and administering
social assistance benefits.  Calculations began in 1973 and were conducted annually
until 1989 when the Korean Institute of Health and Social Affairs (KIHASA), the
government agency which calculates the MCL, conducted surveys only at five year
intervals.  The annual figures are derived by adjusting for inflation (OECD 2000).
In the debate over poverty statistics, one of the major concerns expressed by interview
respondents within the government research institutes, non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) and even some of those in the economic bureaucracy itself, is that the current
survey, from whose data the MCL is calculated, focuses only on earnings.
Problematically, this excludes both the unemployed and, importantly in the South
Korean context, the self-employed.6  Consequently, at the height of the crisis in the first
quarter of 1999, official accounts recognised that up to 8.5 percent of the population
had become poor; an increase of 4.6 percent on the figure for the fourth quarter of 1997
(Figure 1). Alternative calculations, focussing on household expenditures rather than
income, however, have recently shown that just prior to the crisis in the first quarter of
1997, 13.7 percent of the population was below the MCL (a decline of two percent
since 1996).  A year later (the first quarter of 1998), however, this alternative
calculation suggests that poverty had increased to 23.5 percent of the population
(PSPD/UNDP 2000), two to three times the maximum rate that has been officially
reported.
                                                
5 Absolute poverty occurs when a person is unable to meet their minimum basic needs.  For a discussion
and bibliography see World Bank (2000).
6 While unemployment has been low for most of the 1990s, ranging between 2 and 3 percent of the labour
force prior to the crisis (see figure 4), the self-employed population have consistently constituted well
over a quarter of the labour market throughout the 1990s.  For instance, in 1990 28 percent of the labour
force was self-employed with a slightly increase to 28.8 percent by 1999 (OECD 2000).
5Figure 1. Poverty and Unemployment in Korea, 1996-2000
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Field interviews confirmed that while the nature of poverty statistics underlies the
ongoing debate, the conflicts between the government and anti-poverty advocates in
academia and civil society have recently become oriented less towards attempts to
revise official poverty statistics and survey methods, and more to getting the current
(Kim Dae Jung) government to significantly raise the budget for social assistance.
Currently, the social safety net assumes that a little over 3 percent of the population
need support.  Accordingly, some civil organisations have lobbied the government
arguing that the budget should aim to assist 8 percent of the population; the share of the
population officially reported as below the MCL at the height of the Financial Crisis.
The reason the debate has tended to veer away from calls for a fundamental reform in
the process of calculating the statistics, lies in two government counter arguments.
Firstly, the government has argued that calculation based on household expenditure will
overestimate the incidence of absolute poverty because it will allow those who are not
poor to be included as if they were.7 Secondly, it appears that the government has
contemplated, on several occasions, improvements in data gathering to capture the self-
employed (for taxation purposes). Yet it has backed-off from pursuing significant
reforms to include the self-employed as previous attempts to incorporate the self-
employed in surveys have performed badly and were thus not cost effective from the
government’s perspective.8
Given the likelihood that expenditure-based statistics are indeed prone to
overestimation, and that it is not feasible to reform surveys to attempt to capture the
self-employed, the government has maintained its position to err on the conservative
                                                
7 The government's example being those that spend their money frivolously on non-essential items.
8 One social welfare specialist reported that the government was only been able to capture around 23
percent of the total self-employed income estimated to exist by the treasury.  As the costs of initiating
major reforms in existing statistical surveys were not offset by the potential increases in taxation, the
government has consequently decreased its interest in pursuing statistical reforms to capture the self-
employed.
6side of poverty estimates and persist with current statistical conventions. As a
consequence, this means that the most accurate assessments of the incidence of poverty
probably lie somewhere between the government’s estimates and those of its major
critics.
Policy analysts in Korea seem to have assumed that, with economic growth, poverty
would decline to almost zero by the early years of the 21st Century. It is evident,
however, that the rate at which poverty was declining began to slow after the great
improvements that had been achieved between the 1960s and 1980s. By 1991, 7.6
percent of the population  – and perhaps much more – could still be judged to be in
absolute poverty (Kwon, 1998).  While the widespread belief that absolute poverty had
drastically declined in Korea by the mid 1990s appears to be broadly correct, the
problems in methodology and the consequent extent of the statistical discrepancies,
casts doubt on the prevailing view that economic growth, in and of itself, leads to
poverty reduction, even in the country considered the best case scenario for this
argument.
Scepticism about the view that there is a direct relation between economic growth and
poverty reduction can be further justified from the South Korean experience. At the
height of the country's economic success, official data suggested that absolute poverty
had been virtually eliminated. Actual levels of absolute poverty, however, are unlikely
to have been that low given that the destitute, homeless, disabled, mentally ill, elderly in
rural areas and low-income self-employed are, at best, only partly captured by official
statistics.  In addition, there are concerns about the independence of the National
Statistical Office and a widespread belief among Korean specialists on inequality and
poverty that relevant government data is unreliable.9
Furthermore, when one considers South Korea’s performance on relative poverty, the
influence of economic growth on income inequality has not been overly impressive.
For instance, the official figures show that just before the crisis, South Korea had a
GINI co-efficient of 0.292. This rose to 0.337 at the height of the crisis before trailing
back down to 0.315 in the fourth quarter of 2000 (Figure 1).  This suggests that at the
height of the crisis, income inequality reached levels comparable to the mid 1960s (the
period when South Korea also experienced the highest rates of absolute poverty) when
estimates of inequality were 0.33 in 1964 (Martellaro 1989) and 0.343 in 1965 (Choo
                                                
9 Our scepticism derives from three findings.  The first is the fact that the provision of statistical data was,
and remains, not only a monopoly of the government's National Statistical Office (NSO), but it only
became publicly accessible in the 1990s. Secondly, the NSO's independence was queried by many
interview respondents who felt that the impartiality of its activities was compromised by the fact that its
head was formerly appointed by the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) and is now appointed by
the President (on the recommendation of MOFE).  For instance, one former government researcher
confirmed that the current head of the NSO comes from MOFE and that given the post is a political
appointment, the head of the NSO typically remains in post for relatively short periods.   Given that
statistical posts are generally regarded as less prestigious than posts in the government think tanks, they
tend not to attract the best applicants. Thirdly, several respondents offered anecdotal evidence and indeed
personal accounts that suggest that under authoritarian and - to a lesser extent - democratic regimes also,
the government may at times have sought to ‘manage’ statistical data in such a way as to place itself in a
favourable light. For instance, some trade unionists have reported in interviews that recent employment
rates and job creation statistics have been deliberately overestimated.  Furthermore, one former Korea
Development Institute (KDI) researcher recalled incidences where new findings on income inequality
were directly suppressed by senior Economic Planning Board (EPB) managers in the early 1990s,
ultimately underestimating levels of relative poverty.
71982).  Furthermore, even towards the end of the crisis, income inequality had still not
returned to the levels reached in the late 1960s, which one study conservatively
estimated to have been 0.305 in 1968 (Jain 1975).
While great strides have been made in terms of the reduction of absolute poverty in
South Korea the case that absolute poverty has been virtually eliminated needs to be
challenged.  In terms of relative poverty, then there is little evidence of this reducing
given the similarity in GINI co-efficients in the late 1960s and 1990s. If this is so, then
the argument that assumes a direct link between economic growth and poverty
reduction (that is, without the mediation of poverty reduction policies) seems to be
difficult to sustain given that South Korea has been seen as an emblematic case. While
we will return to these issues in the conclusion, we now proceed to examine South
Korea's system of economic governance.
3. ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH KOREA, 1961-2001
Subsequent to the military coup in 1961 and the heavily state-influenced form of
economic development that it set in train, South Korea has seen remarkable advances in
economic performance and social welfare. Underlying the Korean 'miracle' was a model
of capacity-building aimed at engendering the 'developmental state' with an institutional
apparatus organised to provide a coherent and effective system of policy formulation
and implementation. 10 In this section, we attempt a broad description of the institutions
of economic governance, their configuration and how they have developed over time.
Four major developmental phases can be identified to capture changes in the
composition and configuration of South Korea’s governing institutions (see Figure 2).
Each will be discussed in turn below.
Prefacing the argument developed in the following sections, economic governance
through to the present day must be understood within the context of the institutional
legacies of the authoritarianism which dominated the country's political and economic
life from the early 1960s through to the onset of democratisation in the late 1980s.
Successive military regimes shaped Korean policy-making not only with a strong
tendency towards centralised decision-making and autocratic management, but also
with a relatively stable institutional structure. While the former remain in place (in spite
of democratisation), we will argue that institutional stability has been less evident in
over the past ten years or so.
More specifically, authoritarianism has left its mark on Korean economic governance
through two dominant organisational characteristics. These are, the ultimate power of
the President and his office - the Cheong Wa Dae or 'Blue House' - and a system of
policy formulation and implementation that is functionally separated into two parallel
structures: the ministries on the one hand and the government think tanks on the other
(see Figure 2).
                                                
10 For some of the most important analyses of this phenomenon, see Amsden (1989), Woo (1991), Chang
(1994) and Kim (1997). South Korea, of course, was not the only East Asian country to pursue this route
to economic development. Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and - less effectively - Malaysia, all crafted
their own versions of the 'developmental state' model, as did Japan before them. On the larger regional
picture see the essays collected in Appelbaum and Henderson (1992).
8In this section, we will argue that in the years following democratisation in 1987, there
has been a gradual emergence of civil organisations and an increasing role for academic
experts in policy-making. Simultaneously, however, the encroachment of globalising
processes and with them, neo-liberal economic ideas, have spelled the end of coherent
economic planning in South Korea. The economic bureaucracy and its exercise of
power, has been transformed and with this the earlier structural connections between the
ministries and their associated research institutions - crucial to effective economic
planning - have been broken.
Notwithstanding the changes in South Korea’s political economy and the makeover of
its governing institutions, however, our findings suggest that the managerial style and
organisational strategies fostered under the authoritarian regimes, continue to remain at
the heart of economic governance.
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3.1 Authoritarianism and the Developmental State, 1961-1987
Historically, economic governance in South Korea has been highly centralised. From
the military coup in 1961 - led by Park Chung Hee - through to the early 1990s, it was
driven by the interplay of two dominant institutional features: the economic
bureaucracy and the ultimate power of the President (Cheng et al 1998). In this
section, we first sketch some of the key issues associated with the emergence of 'state-
directed' capitalism in South Korea before turning to examine in more detail the
mechanisms of economic governance and related matters.
The 'developmental state' established by the Park regime had three important goals.
First, economic development was promoted as the top priority of the government.
Comprehensive blueprints for economic development were drawn up and
implemented.  Second, reforms were instituted within the government bureaucracy to
assist in economic planning. In particular, the Economic Planning Board (EPB) was
created and subsequently expanded and strengthened.  Third, vital resources for
economic development, including domestic and foreign capital, became closely
regulated by the state 11.  These institutional reforms produced a troika of economic
ministries, with the EPB at its centre and the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of
Trade and Industry supporting the EPB.  The relative autonomy in decision-making
provided to these ministries and the centralized control and coordination by the EPB
were similar to the privileges and power given to the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (MITI) and the Ministry of Finance in Japan (Kim, E.M. 1998).
The EPB's mission included the formulation of long-term economic development
plans, their implementation and management, and the control of both domestic and
foreign capital (through the nationalization of banks and direction of the national
budget).  While it was the most prestigious government agency throughout the 1960s
and 1970s, and continued to exercise significant power through to the onset of
democratisation in the late 1980s, at no time did its remit include a direct concern for
poverty reduction 12.
The EPB was established by amalgamating various plan-oriented departments
scattered throughout the pre-existing bureaucracy and soon consisted of five
bureaux 13 and nineteen departments, employing about 600 government officials. It
was headed by an assistant minister who, in December 1963, was elevated to hold,
simultaneously, the position of deputy prime minister (Choi 1991). This ensured that
                                                
11 Castells (1992) refers to these reforms, and their equivalents in Taiwan and Singapore, as part of a
'political economy of survival'. In other words, they were driven largely by geo-political threats to the
respective regimes, which in the case of South Korea were posed by the Kim Il Sung regime in North
Korea.
12 In that sense, among others, it was very unlike Malaysia's Economic Planning Unit for which it was a
model (see Henderson et al 2002).
13 These included the Bureaux of Comprehensive Planning , Material Resource Mobilization (from the
Ministry of Construction),  Statistics (from the Ministry of Internal Affairs), Budget (from the Ministry
of Finance) and Supply. The latter enabled the EPB to control the procurement, supply, and
management of all domestic and foreign capital and goods.
11
other ministries usually fell into line when EPB sought to ‘coordinate’ their plans and
actions (EPB 1982).14
The development plans developed by the Park regime were implemented in a semi-
militaristic, manner. The state forcibly intervened in the market and while it did not
have recourse to significant levels of state ownership 15, it sought to be omnipresent in
the market.  There were two ways in which the South Korean state enforced its
economic policies.  Firstly, it used a series of mechanisms to discipline the chaebol
(large conglomerates). For much of the 1960s and 1970s it was clearly the dominant
partner in its loose alliance with the chaebol.  Rather than allow them to respond to
'market signals' the military government forced cooperation in its development plans
from the business leaders.16 As development proceeded and by the late 1970s,
however, the relationship between the state and the chaebol became more symbiotic.
Through to the early 1990s, however, the state continued to control domestic and
foreign capital - and the chaebol's access to both - and it used its power to enforce
strict guidelines for domestic loans.  The chaebol had to compete with one another to
receive subsequent, low interest credit from the state, which was provided only to
support government-approved initiatives consistent with national development plans
(Mardon 1990, Woo 1991) 17. While there was undoubtedly corruption involved in
South Korean state-business relations, it took a 'developmental' form - with positive
consequences - rather than the ‘predatory’ or ‘acquisitive’ and (literally) counter-
productive forms of corruption typical of many other developing countries
(Henderson 1999).
The second way in which the state used authoritarian means to achieve its economic
goals was the repression of industrial workers. The state’s policies were intended to
keep wages low and to limit, and indeed prohibit, labour unions (Cho, H. 1993, Choi
1989).  The lack of minimum-wage legislation prior to 1988 and the poor enforcement
of laws relating to working conditions resulted in significant levels of worker
exploitation (Song 1991).  The police and the Korean Central Intelligence Agency
were used to monitor labour activities and extensive force was used to prevent or
control strikes (Ogle 1990)18.
                                                
14 While elevating the rank of the EPB minister to Deputy Prime Minster did provide the EPB with a
formal authority, via the budget, over the coordination and executing economic development plans, it
did not necessarily elevate the EPB minister above the other economic ministers.  For instance, while
ministers were required to consult with the EPB head prior to initiating major economic policies, when
their policy proposals did not affect the budget, other economic ministers often tended not to consult
the deputy prime minister prior to initiating policy proposals (Choi 1991).
15 In addition to the banks and utilities, only steel - in the form of the sector's largest company, POSCO
- was state owned.
16 Initially under threat of indictment on charges of having illicitly accumulated wealth under the
former Rhee and Chang Myon regimes.
17 Given that the chaebol were wholly-owned by family dynasties who resisted recourse to the capital
market (under-developed anyway in South Korea) for investment funds, state control of credit (and the
'socialisation' of investment risk associated with it) proved to be a decisive - and largely successful -
development tool. In addition to Woo's (1991) book on South Korea, see Zysman (1983) and Whitley
(1992) for some of the theoretical issues behind such strategies.
18 While the repression of labour movements was, and remains, fairly general in the developing world,
South Korea witnessed some of East Asia's most brutal incidents and these probably contributed to the
emergence of a labour movement there that was, until recently, the most militant in the entire continent.
On the issues involved in the rise of trade union militancy in South Korea, see Deyo (1989).
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Under an authoritarian state, the centralisation of military control would have deep-
seated effects upon the structure of the bureaucracy in general, and the structure of
economic decision-making in particular (Cheng et al, 1998).  As we turn to next,
militaristic forms of hierarchy and regimentation would equally define the
institutional structures and governing mechanisms for policy formulation and
implementation.
Mechanics of Economic Governance
From interviews with senior officials in the economic bureaucracy as well as
government researchers, academics and civil activists, economic governance under
the authoritarian regimes seems to have been conducted via a relatively stable
institutional configuration which governed the process of policy formulation and
implementation (see Figure 2).
In post-coup Korea, the function of formulating policies was organisationally
separated from their implementation. With regard to policy formulation, one dominant
feature of economic governance was the role of policy 'experts'.  Under
authoritarianism, there were isolated cases where advocates in NGOs succeeded in
providing input into the policy formulation. Where they did, such NGOs seem to have
lost their independence, becoming converted into quasi governmental agencies.19
Generally speaking, however, 'independent' policy expertise and formulation capacity
existed only in academia. In these cases, the most desirable career path involved
progress from the top universities into the government research institutes.
Korea began systematically developing its research institutes in the 1960s. Each new
institute was conceived in relation to a particular ministry that would completely fund
their respective activities.20  In turn, the corresponding ministry was the primary, if
not exclusive, recipient of their policy advice.
Several interviews confirmed that very close relations existed between the ministries
and the research institutes.  Anecdotal accounts describe how working relationships
were sufficiently intimate and the number of researchers limited enough, to enable
both the policy-makers and the experts to engage in mutual dialogue and learning.
Under authoritarianism, such close arrangements between researchers and their
bureaucratic clients possibly developed because the number of individuals with the
necessary academic qualifications were in short supply during the formative years of
the post-coup bureaucracy, and because policy-making issues were focussed almost
exclusively on the goals of economic development.  As one respondent put it, during
this period, 'the bureaucrats and researchers could engage in a common language
oriented towards a common goal'.  Such arrangements also attest to the fact that under
authoritarianism, as several respondents indicated, the formulation of policies was
perhaps the primary challenge faced by economic planners given that military
dictatorship and its control over the chaebol, labour organisations and the media, let
alone the bureaucracy, meant that the implementation of policies was able to proceed
                                                
19 Similar developments have taken place in Malaysia. See Henderson et al 2002.
20 It should be noted that, at least initially, not all ministries had a corresponding think tank.  The social
ministries developed corresponding research institutes later than the economic ministries, which may
have reflected their lower status in the ministerial pecking order.
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relatively unchallenged, notwithstanding the rise of student and other opposition
movements from the mid-1970s onwards.
The main bastion of research expertise was the Korean Development Institute (KDI).
The KDI was established in 1971 by President Park and was charged with formulating
and designing both the five-year economic plans which framed economic
development at the macro level, as well as, from 1972, engaging in the formulation of
social policy (Kwon 1999).  The latter, however, as far as both the KDI and senior
levels of the bureaucracy were concerned, was very much a secondary focus. The
institutional position and power of the KDI relative to the other think tanks directly
mirrored that of the EPB and its near absolute power over all the line ministries
engaged in policy implementation.21
The Economic Planning Board was the epitome of the bureaucratic structure of
policy-making during Korea’s development era (early 1960s to late 1980s).  It
embodied the governance practices and style of national economic management long
established under authoritarian rule, namely the centralisation of decision-making
located in what was in effect, a relatively autonomous 'super-ministry'.  At an
organisational level, the autonomy of the EPB was oriented towards developing a
form of economic governance through which the authoritative coordination of
economic and social policies was possible.  At an operational level, the EPB's
autonomy insulated officials from the bulk of the bureaucracy (with the exception of
the Presidential Office) and the undemocratic, repressive state ensured that it was
insulated from any oppositional movements that might develop in civil society. It was
free, therefore, to implement policies in whatever way was deemed necessary for
economic development. Among other things this meant that EPB officials were free to
mediate between the owners of the chaebol so that the government could selectively
target one or another of them so as to direct resources in order to optimise the
possibilities for economic growth (Kim, H-R. 2000a).
While the parallel structures between research think tanks and the ministries
established a longstanding institutional configuration governing policy formulation
and implementation, it should be noted that the story of economic governance under
authoritarian rule is equally, if not more so, a story about the most powerful decision-
making figure of all, the President. It seems clear that despite the autonomy given to
the economic bureaucracy in coordinating policy formulation and implementation, the
delegation of power to the machinery of government in general, was of a second order
to the ultimate authority bestowed on the President. At times, the role of the President
in economic governance has been both to provide the framework within which
policies are formulated, as well as to provide the developmental goals around which
economic and social policies are implemented.  At other times, however, the power of
the President was used to circumvent the executive-legislative divide, intervening in
policy-making processes in such a way as to specify the content of policies as well
                                                
21 While the EPB was the lead agency in the economic bureaucracy, the Ministry of Finance and the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) were also significant agencies making up the troika of
economic governance.  As one senior official described it , 'the MOF’s power lay in the collection of
taxes and supervision of financial institutions.  The MCI, while the lesser of the three, was influential
especially as industrial and trade policies were central to the government’s strategy throughout most of
the development period'.
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(Cheng et al 1998).  As will be clear from later sections, this feature of governance
has persisted through to the present day.
Over and above the actual mechanics of policy formulation and implementation
described here, there is an issue important to our concerns that seems very clear.
While there was some attention to matters of social welfare during the authoritarian
period, poverty and inequality did not figure as a significant issue for economic
policy. Only with regard to price controls in the domestic market (Amsden 1989),
which would have helped the poor, is there any evidence of a concern for poverty
within economic policy-making. Beyond this it appears that the planners of Korea’s
‘economic miracle’ assumed that the ‘trickle down’ effects of economic growth, and
the support mechanisms of the family, would provide social security and reduce
deprivation.
3.2 Democratisation and the rise of civil society, 1987-1993
While not immediately upsetting the institutional structure, the beginnings of political
democratisation in 1987 represented a key moment in the evolution of South Korea's
economic governance. Democratisation was fostered by, and in turn continued to
foster, the rise of diverse social movements engaged, at times, in vehement challenges
to centralised, authoritarian forms of policy-making.  With democratisation, such
movements became more able to diversify their efforts and began to target specific
policy areas - especially those concerned with social welfare - that had previously
been a low priority for the Government. Additionally democratisation opened an
institutional space for the formal political expression of interests that had been
mobilised in civil society. With this development the institutions of economic
governance were confronted with the need to transform the roles and functions that
had been inherited from the authoritarian era (Kim, K.R. 2000a).22
With President Roh Tae Woo's administration (1988-92) there began to be signs of
change within the economic bureaucracy. In particular, our respondents reported that
with the beginnings of democratisation, the onus in the policy process began to shift
from the earlier stress on policy formulation (addressed above) to a greater priority for
policy implementation.
Reflecting the shift in emphasis towards policy implementation, several respondents
felt that soon after democratisation, the relative importance of the government think
tanks began to decline. By the beginning of the 1990s, it seems that the close personal
connections that once characterised the relations between the bureaucrats and the
research institutes, had begun to wane.  Leading think tanks such as KDI had become
a victim of their own success. They began to attract large numbers of US-trained, and
thus neo-classical economists, producing voluminous and increasingly academically-
                                                
22 Such a transformation was not an inevitable product of democratisation, however. As the
Singaporean experience has shown, authoriarianism and democracy can go hand in hand such that the
economic bureaucracy of the state can continue to be insulated not only from the political process in
civil society, but also from its representations in the legislature. On the Singapore case see Rodan
(1989) and Koh (1997).
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oriented research reports, which, according to one official, were less accessible and
less relevant to the tasks faced by the economic managers.
To grasp the new changes facing policymakers, we need look beyond the formal
layers of the developmental state.  The rapid development of an organised civil
society (the rise of independent and militant trade unions, for instance) represented a
critical development driving the shift in the focus of South Korea's governing
institutions and ultimately challenging the stable institutional arrangements that
supported authoritarian policy-making.  Control over the media, and thus of public
opinion and debate, could no longer be relied upon. Furthermore, the autonomy of the
decision-making process (itself largely a derivative of the state's capacity to repress
the development of effective forms of civil organisation), could no longer prevent the
development of non-governmental organisations that actively sought to redress a
number of social issues that previously had been subordinated to their struggle for
democracy.
Associated with the emergence of formal democracy, a key transformation in civil
society was the development of the labour movement that had previously been a
prime target for state repression.  There was an upsurge in union membership and
activity, venting workers' dissatisfaction that had built-up under authoritarianism.
With the onset of democratisation, the number of labour disputes increased tenfold
(Figure 3).  Along with workers' dissatisfaction with the government, activists
increasingly challenged the monopolistic trade union structure itself.  A number of
enterprise unions moved to create rival union federation centres, breaking away from
the Federation of Korean Trade Unions, the 'yellow union', which has long been the
only officially-tolerated national forum for union activity, and one that was compliant
with the wishes of both management and government.  These more militant factions
eventually (1995) amalgamated to form a rival trade union (discussed further in the
next section).
 Figure 3: Strikes and Lockouts, South Korea 1970-2000
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Whereas civil movements were largely suppressed under authoritarianism23
democratisation created the space for a dramatic expansion of NGOs. For instance, 74
percent of the NGOs currently in South Korea were established after 1987, 35 percent
during the Roh administration (1987-92) and 39 percent during the Kim Young Sam
government (1993-97) (Kim, H.R. 2000b).  Having achieved political
democratisation, the focus of the NGOs turned to a range of social issues including
income disparity, real estate speculation, and economic justice (Kim, H.R. 2000b).
One of the most notable and successful civil society developments during this period
was the inception of the Citizen’s Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ).
The CCEJ was the first major NGO to tackle social welfare issues.  Its members urged
the government to change policies over housing eviction and lobbied for the need to
build more homes (a need the government responded to with its New Town Policy in
the early 1990s).  Furthermore, the CCEJ pressured the government to prevent land
speculation.  As one CCEJ member recalled, their original campaigns attempted to
introduce more transparency in land deals given that over the previous decades, five
percent of the population, especially the owners of the large chaebol had, in their
estimation, come to own in excess of 60 percent of the land in South Korea (also see
Henderson 1999).
Support from academics appears to have been central to the development of the new
civil organisations. For a number of NGOs, university professors (between 250 and
300 currently work with the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD),
for instance) helped their expansion by bringing to them both technical competency in
areas such as economics and law as well as credibility in policy-making circles.
Academic expertise was also central to the labour movement particularly when the
reform of labour law became a matter for public debate for the first time.24
Successful university academics had always tended to move into public service (in
preference to the private sector). Under the authoritarian regimes, their influence in
the structure of policy-making was largely confined to positions in the state research
institutes such as KDI. With democratisation, however, several respondents felt that
policy-makers - including the President's Office - began to use selected academics
from Korea’s elite universities as key advisors.
                                                
23 Most infamously when the police attacked a demonstration in Kwangju in 1980, leaving a death toll
estimated at anywhere between 200 and 2000. One NGO that was tolerated by the authoritarian
regimes was the 'Wednesday Group'. This was a small voluntary organisation of doctors, academics
and civil servants which, in the late 1950s early 1960s met every Wednesday to discuss concerns over
medical insurance.  After the military coup of 1961, future President but then chairman of the Health
and Social Affairs committee of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, Park Chung-Hee,
resumed efforts initiated in December 1960 by the first Minister of Health and Social Affairs to
established this group as a formal Committee for Social Security (CSS), transforming this once civil
organisation into an official advisory committee to support his later attempts as President to introduce
the first social welfare programmes in Korea (see Kwon 1999).  The CSS would then again ultimately
transform into the Korean Institute for Health and Social Affairs (KIHASA), a fully-fledged
governmental think tank operating under the auspices of the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare.
24 For instance, in the creation of the Labour Law Review Committee in 1992, several university
professors joined alongside members of the FKTU and the Korean Employers' Foundation to help draft
revisions to the labour laws (Choi 2000).
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3.3 Globalisation, neo-liberalism and the new 'Super-Ministry', 1993-
1997
Where the Roh administration (1988-1992) was engrossed in managing the transition
to democracy, the Kim Young Sam administration (1993-1997) sought to make its
mark by 'modernising' the economy.   Partly driven by its perceived need to be seen as
a good global economic citizen, as a prelude to membership of the OECD (achieved
in 1996), the Kim Young Sam administration instituted policies that were designed to
change South Korea’s image from that of a developing economy ‘piloted’ by an
interventionist state, to an image of the country as a mature and developed economy
governed by market forces and a relatively disengaged, economically liberal state. In
furtherance of this aim, the Kim government introduced Segyehwa, which can loosely
translated as 'Globalisation Policy'.
Although there were 43 projects covered by Segyehwa, their primary goal was to
further market liberalisation. The government liberalised exchange rates, abolished
various protectionist measures (including on the import of rice) and liberalised
regulations on domestic and international capital investments (Park 1996).
Additionally, the government reduced the size of the state bureaucracy, justifying its
actions by means of neo-liberal 'small state' rhetoric.25
In many ways Korea’s experience with globalisation represented a distinct juncture in
economic governance, fuelled by an effort to hasten the liberalisation process and
restructure its governing institutions.  As Kim (2000a:568) argues, in executing
reforms, 'the government overlooked the possibility that withdrawing state
intervention [in the interests] of deregulation [might] rather dismantle the foundation
for economic governance'. Indeed, interviewees inside the economic bureaucracy
offered similar views, confirming that liberalisation occurred 'too fast' and without the
introduction of the sorts of financial sector regulations that could have prevented the
excess credit that was one of the causes of the economic crisis.26
Particularly detrimental to the country's economic policy-making capacity, and thus -
arguably - its long term economic health, was the abolition of the Economic Planning
Board as an autonomous unit. Two of its key divisions - the Supervisory Board of
Financial Affairs and the Department of Planning and Budget - were transferred to the
Ministry of Finance, creating a new 'super-ministry', the Ministry of Finance and
                                                
25 Under Kim Young Sam, the limited government initiative aimed to reduce the civil service by 10
percent over the course of his five-year term. In the event, moves to reduce the number of civil servants
extended into the Kim Dae Jung administration, clashing with efforts to expand the social protection
system and with it, the pressures for increases in staff. For instance, some respondents have commented
upon the coordination problems between the Ministry of Planning and Budget (MPB) and the Ministry
of Government Administration and Home Affairs (MOGAHA) over the implementation of the National
Basic Livelihood Security Act passed in 2000.  On the one hand the MPB attempted to increase the
workforce allocated to NBLS implementation given that workload ratios were roughly 500 cases for
each civil servant. On the other, however, the MOGAHA resisted MPB moves to expand staff numbers
given its opposing mandate to reduce the number of civil servants.
26 While most of the excess credit flowed to the chaebol (as we indicate below), substantial amounts
also ended up fuelling an economic bubble driven by a consumption boom on overseas travel and
luxury items.  For instance, debt associated with travel accounts jumped from US$0.57 billion in 1993
to US$1.19 billion in 1995 and then to US$2.6 billion in 1996, while the current account deficit
increased from US$3.8 billion in 1994 to US$8.5 in 1995 and US$23.7 in 1996 (Lee 2000).
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Economy (MOFE). 27 Several respondents confirmed that in creating this super-
ministry, the government had eroded its capacity for checks and balances in the
policy-making processes (a verdict that would be confirmed after the crisis). As a
consequence, the institutional mechanisms were in place for South Korea's
subsequently rapid shift from a long-term planning to a short term, finance-driven,
form of economic governance.
Alongside changes in the economic bureaucracy, the role played by the research
institutes in policy formulation was also changing. Along with the finance-led
economic bureaucracy, several respondents felt that the Korea Development Institute
had also begun to concentrate its research focus on areas such as public finance rather
than social welfare.  As one former senior KDI researcher confirmed, by the mid
1990s, concerns over social welfare in general, and poverty and inequality in
particular, had disappeared from KDI activities (leaving these issues to more
specialist institutes such as the Korea Labour Institute and the Korea Institute for
Health and Social Affairs).  Furthermore, responses from several policy-makers
expressed views that research organisations such as KDI had a much depreciated role,
tending to become 'merely' think tanks rather than key policy-formulating agencies in
their own right.
Beyond the bureaucracy, organisations within Korean civil society continued to grow
in size and to some extent in political influence (although with signs of increasing
polarisation and internal differentiation that would become increasingly apparent after
the economic crisis).  For instance in 1994, the People’s Solidarity for Participatory
Democracy (PSPD) was established.  Focusing on all aspects of social welfare, the
rapid growth of the PSPD appears to have motivated the CCEJ to retreat from its
original concerns over social welfare (particularly housing and land speculation).
Rather, during the 1990s, the CCEJ began to mobilise efforts to promote its own
views on economic reform more generally.  As one housing expert indicated, the
CCEJ's original focus now seems to have been marginalised as it has come to be
dominated by neo-classical (and largely American trained) economists who have
tended to emphasize their view on market reform.
In the labour movement, the trade unionists which had broken away from the
Federation of Korean Trade Unions to set up rival organisations, by 1995 had merged
their efforts and established the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU).  The
nature of the KCTU leadership has been a key to the more militant approach taken by
the organisation.  Many of the leaders were trained by early activists and socialists,
themselves experiencing state repression during the drive to promote Korea’s heavy
industries in the 1970s.  Their militant approach and critical stance towards the
government, delayed their official recognition until 1999.28
The influence of civil organisations upon policy-makers also grew as significant
moves to formalise the institutional channels for social dialogue ensued.  For instance,
the government created the Industrial Relations Reform Commission (IRRC) in 1996
                                                
27 According to former EPB personnel, this treatment was effected with no internal debate or
forewarning, leaving most staff to learn of the decision from Kim Young Sam’s televised address. The
EPB's social planning division, however, was not transferred to the MOFE.
28 It should be noted that trade union militancy was one of the key factors driving the upward
movement of manual workers' wages from the late 1980s and speeding up the ‘trickle down’ of growth.
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(Choi 2000).  As the successor to the Labour Law Review Committee created four
years earlier, the IRRC was given a specific two-year mandate to build a consensus
concerning revision in the labour law and report its proposals to the President.
Unlike its predecessor, the IRRC promoted widespread public debate.  Yet the
benefits of expanding the social dialogue were ultimately overshadowed by covert
redrafting of the IRRC proposals. Under pressure from the chaebol and other
employers, last minute reforms to the labour law ignored union arguments for job
security and promoted the standard neo-liberal concerns with labour market
'flexibility'. The workers' response was a general strike in December 1996 which
resulted in the repeal of the new labour laws.
3.4 Crisis and the reform of economic governance, 1997-2001
With hindsight, it is clear that it is courting disaster to liberalise an economy and
undertake associated bureaucratic reforms, as did the South Korean government,
without, at the same time, building an institutional capacity to manage the now freer
markets. Some analysts have argued that by failing to build the state’s capacity for
market oversight, the Kim Young Sam government was unable to manage the
adjustment from a relatively planned to a more market-driven economy (Kim, H.R.
2000a; Lee 2000).29 Nowhere was this more clear than in the case of the merchant
banks which expanded dramatically from the late 1980s and became one of the
principal sources of the economic crisis of the late 1990s.
Throughout the developmental era, the relationship between the government and the
chaebol has been that of implicit risk-sharing partners, with local financial institutions
serving as facilitators for the national drive for industrialisation. The state’s
'managagement' of the chaebol was institutionally centred on the EPB and practically
on loans in support of policy initiatives coupled with restrictions on the flows of
foreign capital and interest rate manipulations.30 Between 1961 and 1982 the
government owned all the major banks and directed policy loans to government
priority sectors such as in exports and heavy chemical industries.31 Even after the
privatisation of the commercial banks in 1982, they were subject to tight regulation
until the early 1990s. The share of government-approved policy loans in total
commercial bank loans, for instance, remained around 60 percent between 1987-91
(see Table 1)
                                                
29 Lee (2000) has argued that following the crisis, economic policy decision-making became
increasingly politicised (a view supported by our analysis).  As a consequence, many market actors
lobbied officials to further weaken the already weak mechanisms charged with regulating the newly
liberalised economy.
30 There was, of course, much more to it than this, including, apparently, draconian laws designed to
limit capital flows into speculative (as distinct from productive) investments. For a summary of the
policy instruments used by South Korean governments during the 'developmental era', see Henderson
(1993).
31 During the heavy chemical industrialization drive in the 1970s, for instance, policy loans constituted
about 50 percent of total domestic credit (Kim, E.M. et al 2000).
20
Table 1: Share of Policy Loans by Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) and Non-Bank
Financial Institutions (NBFIs)
                                                                                        (Unit: %)
1973-81 1982-86 1987-91 Average during entire
period 1973-91
DMB loans (A)
Government funds 7.5 7.4 8.0 7.6
National Investment Fund 4.3 5.1 3.0 4.2
Foreign currency loans 21.1 19.7 19.4 20.3
Export loans 21.3 16.9 5.1 16.2
Commercial bills discounted 8.0 13.9 16.5 11.6
Special funds for SMCs 5.9 5.6 6.5 6.0
Loans for AFL 6.1 5.3 7.4 6.2
Housing loans 8.0 13.1 14.1 10.8
Other 17.7 13.1 20.0 17.1
Policy Loans Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
NBFI loans (B)
KDB loans 91.9 71.7 83.7 84.8
(National Investment Fund) (25.7)* (18.5) (7.9) (19.5)
EXIM loans 8.1 28.3 16.3 15.2
(National Investment Fund) (2.5)* (4.7) (2.3) (3.0)
Policy Loans Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(A)/DMB loans 63.0 59.4 59.5 61.2
(B)/NBFI loans 48.0 32.3 15.3 35.9
((A)+(B))/domestic credit 48.9 40.8 30.9 42.4
Notes:
1) Figures are annual averages.
2) * : Annual average during 1974-1981.
3) Includes loans for imports of key raw materials, loans on mutual installment, loans for
machinery, equipment loans to the export industry, special equipment funds, and special
long-term loans.
Sources: National Statistical Office, Korean Economic Indicators, various issues: Bank of
Korea, Monthly Bulletin, various issues. Quoted from Cho, Yoon Je and Kim, Joon-
Kyung (1995)
With the privatisation of the banks and in spite of restrictions on the size of individual
share holdings32, it was the chaebol that eventually became dominant amongst the
largest shareholders (see Table 2).
                                                
32 In 1982, when the privatization of the banking sector was implemented, a ceiling of 8 percent was
imposed on individual ownership of nationwide commercial banks in order to prevent any single
shareholder exerting excessive influence over a bank’s management.  This restriction was further
strengthened when the ceiling was lowered to 4 percent in 1994. Despite this restriction, however, the
ownership distribution of South Korean banks became as concentrated as those elsewhere, such as the
USA. By the end of 1996, the combined shares of large shareholders (those owning more than one
percent of the total voting stock) of nationwide banks amounted to an average of over 39 percent.  For
local banks, whose ownership structure is much more concentrated than nationwide banks, due to a
higher ceiling, the combined shares of large shareholders was nearly 50 percent (Table 2) (Kim, E.M.
et al 2000).
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Table 2: Share of Banks Owned by the Top 30 Chaebol
                                                (As of the end of 1996, Unit:%)
Chaebol Ownership Share for Each Bank
1. Hyundai Korea First Bank(2.20), Hanvit Bank(2.00), Seoul Bank(1.99),
Kangwon Bank(11.89)
2. Samsung Chohung Bank(2.81), Commercial Bank(7.03), Korea First
Bank(3.96), Hanil Bank(4.76), Seoul Bank(3.77), Korea
exchange Bank(1.05), Shinhan Bank(3.36), KorAm Bank(1.02),
Hana Bank(3.42), Peace Bank(1.28), Daegu Bank(5.65), Pusan
Bank(1.02), Kyonggi Bank(1.57), Jeonbook Bank(1.20),
Kangwon Bank(1.22), Kyung nam Bank(2.38)
3. LG Korea First Bank(3.03), Hanil Bank(2.47), Boram Bank(7.58),
Cheju Bank(1.80)
4. Daewoo KorAm Bank(18.56)
5. SK Kyonggi Bank(3.42)
6. Ssangyong Chohung Bank(1.98), Korea Exchange Bank(1.04), Hana
Bank(1.52), Kookmin Bank(1.96)
7. Hanjin
8. Kia Kyonggi Bank(5.63)
9. Hanwha Korea First Bank(1.04)
10. Lotte Chungchong Bank(16.49), Pusan Bank(23.93)
11. Kumho Kwangju Bank(7.87)
12. Doosan Boram Bank(11.34)
13. Daelim Hanil Bank(3.57)
14. Hanbo
15. DongAh Seoul Bank(1.50), Cheju Bank(2.31)
16. Halla
17. Hyosung Hana Bank(5.16), Kyungnam Bank(11.57)
18. Dongkuk Steel Seoul Bank(1.27), Pusan Bank(3.85), Kyungnam Bank(3.92)
19. Jinro Hana Bank(3.51)
20. Kolon Boram Bank(5.80)
21. Tongyang Donghwa Bank(1.03)
22. Hansol
23. Dongbu Cheju Bank(1.06), Chungbuk Bank(1.74)
24. Kohab
25. Haitai
26. Sammi
27. Hanil
28. Kukdong-Construction
29. New Core
30. Byucksan
Source: The Bank Supervisory Board (Kim et. al 2000).
More importantly - because they were crucial to the onset of financial turmoil in 1997
- the non-banking financial institutions (NBFIs) were largely free of ownership
restrictions. As a result, many NBFIs came to be owned and controlled by the chaebol
By 1997, the 70 largest chaebol owned a total of 114 NBFIs (an average of five
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NBFIs each in the case of the 5 largest chaebol ) concentrated in securities, merchant
banking, insurance and installment credit (see Table 3)!
Table 3:  Number of Non-Banking Financial Institutions Owned by the Top 70
Chaebol
                                                  (As of the end of 1997,Unit: number of firms)
Top 5
Chaebols
Top 6-30
Chaebols
Top 31-70
Chaebols
Total
Merchant Bank (29) 3 7 4 14
Securities (26) 6 5 1 12
Investment Trust (24) 4 6 0 10
Life Insurance (31) 2 4 8 14
Fire & Marine Insurance (13) 2 3 0 5
Installment Credit (26) 2 7 3 12
Mutual Saving & Finance (219) 1 5 12 18
Venture Capital (56) 3 4 6 13
Credit Card (7) 3 1 0 4
Finance & Factoring (46) 3 4 5 12
Total (487) 29 46 39 114
Notes:
1) The rank of chaebol is based on total borrowings.
2) The figure in the parentheses represents the total number of financial institutions at each
financial sector.
3) Leasing companies are excluded as they are owned by banks.
Source: National Information and Credit Evaluation Inc.
In spite of the highly concentrated ownership structure of the NBFIs, financial
supervision was lax. While the principal regulator and supervisor of NBFIs was
notionally the Ministry of Finance and Economy, only a small and ineffective
working-level unit was assigned to the supervisory role. In short, the NBFIs were
under the strong influence of chaebol while government supervision had become all
but absent (Kim, E.M. et al 2000).
The policy loans and the state's sharing of investment risk associated with them, then,
certainly contributed to rapid industrialisation, but also encouraged heavy corporate
leverage - with debt-equity ratios of up to 5:1 - and the creation of an 'immature'
banking sector.33 With (a) the abandonment of strategic economic planning and the
weakening of financial regulation that resulted from the demise of the EPB with (b)
the liberalisation of financial markets associated with the 'globalisation policy', (c) the
explosion of short-term credit and (d) the fact that both the 'real' economy and the
financial sector were largely owned by the chaebol anyway (who were themselves the
                                                
33 What principally drove the need for such high levels of corporate leverage, however, was the
aggressive competition among the chaebol themselves. It should be borne in mind that while debt-
equity ratios of even 1:1 were (and are) inconceivable in capital market-financed forms of capitalism
(such as in Britain and the United States), the South Korean ratios were fairly typical by Japanese (and
other East Asian) corporate standards. Indeed their economic 'miracles' that would have been
inconceivable without such high debt-equity ratios and the risk-sharing associated with them.
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major beneficiaries of the loans) and in the South Korean context, you had a disaster
waiting to happen. By 1997 when debt-equity ratios had reached over 20:1, as they
were for some chaebol, and bankruptcies began to ensue 34, financial panic - given the
dynamics of 'mad money' (Strange 1998) - and the economic and social devastation it
wrought, was inevitable. It seems clear from the South Korean case that a principal
determinant - at the global economic moment when it mattered most - was under-
regulation not over-regulation as has been argued across East Asia (see Chang 1998,
Chang et al 1998, Henderson 1999).
Dilemmas of post-crisis reform
As the government looked for the causes of and scapegoats for the crisis, one view
was that the concentration of policy-making powers and information in the Ministry
of Finance and Economy was, in part, to blame for the lack of early detection of the
sign of impending economic demise.  Indeed, there is evidence that at least some of
the senior bureaucrats in the economic bureaucracy, the Ministry of Commerce and
the Bank of Korea in particular, had raised concerns prior to the crisis and that the
MOFE, despite having control over all of the main policy-making tools and
comprehensive access to information, did not react to these concerns.  Thus, the
emerging verdict was that this new lead agency in the economic bureaucracy was
culpable for failing to prevent, if not helping to precipitate, the crisis. 35 As a
consequence, one of the first tasks of the current (from 1998) Kim Dae Jung
administration was to restructure the state bureaucracy once more.
In terms of the economic agencies, the most notable target of the government reform
effort was the rationalisation of macroeconomic functions and a restructuring of the
Ministry of Finance and Economy. MOFE was deprived of two critical
responsibilities - budgetary and financial supervision - but it was left in charge of
taxation and related financial policies.  In reorganising responsibilities, two further
agencies were introduced into the economic bureaucracy, the Ministry of Planning
and Budget (MPB) and the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC).
In creating the Financial Supervisory Commission, the government consolidated
several agencies previously charged with supervising the banks, securities companies,
and insurance firms.  Reporting directly to the President, the agency took over
regulatory reforms and supervision of both the financial and corporate sector.
The Ministry of Planning and Budget was created in mid 1999 through the merger of
the Board of Planning and Budget and the Budget Office (both of which had been
created in early 1998).  The MPB was given responsibility for the planning of all
national policies as well as the management of the national budget.  As a
consequence, MPB officials now engage in the planning, budgeting, implementation
                                                
34 By the end of 1996, debt-equity ratios for some of the larger, but less prominent chaebol, were 21:1
for Halla, 32:1 for Sammi and a staggering 86:1 for Jinro (Henderson 1999).
35 The backlash against the MOFE 'super-ministry' was underlined by a special parliamentary
committee on the crisis chaired by the Minister of Commerce.  Indeed, the Deputy Prime Minister
(head of the  MOFE) was prosecuted and his post as Deputy PM was (temporarily) disbanded in 1998.
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and evaluation stages for all economic and social policies where the budget is
concerned.36
With the rationalisation and reorganisation of the economic bureaucracy, policy
coordination has become even more crucial to effective national economic
management.  Unfortunately, however, effective coordination among the state's
economic agencies continues to be problematic. Interview evidence from within the
economic bureaucracy suggests that the coordination problems are seen as a product
of the contestation associated with democratisation more than as a product of
bureaucratic reforms.  Other respondents, however, report that the presentation of
economic policies for public consumption is increasingly disjointed and inconsistent,
implying that at least part of the problem derives from the structure of the bureaucracy
and the inter-agency competition that it is generating.
Other evidence suggests that recent reforms have indeed failed to deal with the
problems of policy coordination and may even have exacerbated them.  In terms of
monetary policy, for instance, the reforms may have actually increased coordination
problems by creating a system where the authority to manage monetary and financial
policy is divided among three agencies: the Bank of Korea, the Ministry of Finance
and Economy, and the Financial Supervisory Commission.37
Indeed, the reform effort as a whole has been faced with organisational change and
implementation problems.  For instance, while one problematic super-ministry
(MOFE) was being restructured, another was being created, this time in charge of
overall government administration.  The Ministry of Government Administration and
Home Affairs (MOGAHA) was created in 1998.38 Inundated with projects and
responsibilities, during the second wave of public sector reforms in 1999, the
government reversed tack, this time attempting to take responsibilities for civil service
reform away from MOGAHA, and locate them in a new dedicated agency: the Civil
Service Commission. The transfer of reform implementation responsibilities to the
Civil Service Commission, however, have proved problematic, seemingly because
MOGAHA has resisted the dilution of its power.
If the institutional reforms exacerbated coordination problems at the level of
implementation, they had similar implications for the process of policy formulation.
In 1998, the ministries and their research institutes were formally separated. In the
reorganisation, all research institutes (over 50 fifty large organisations) were placed
under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)—the much weaker
                                                
36 According to one official, the MPB’s role in policy-making begins with meeting the ministries
involved in a particular policy initiative.  Only in the case of a disagreement will the MPB consult with
the research institutes for advice.  Once a budget is agreed upon by the ministries and the MPB, the
budget is presented to the general assembly of Parliament.  After Parliamentary approval, the MPB
oversees the implementation of the policies and monitors expenditure.
37 In terms of monetary policy, attempts to rationalise the financial system were pursued through
changes in the Central Bank.  Where the Bank of Korea was originally set up to facilitate the state’s
economic development plans and serve as the government’s bank, comprehensive reform in the Bank
of Korea Act immediately after the onset of the crisis sought to increase the Central Bank’s
independence from the government, giving it an increasing role in financial supervision.  For instance,
in 1998, the Bank became responsible for monetary policy and inflation, losing previous functions such
as market supervision that was transferred to the FSC.
38 By merging the previous Ministries of Government Administration and Home Affairs.
25
counterpart to the Presidential 'Blue House'.  The restructuring required that each
institute’s policy- output be reported to the PMO.  Furthermore, the funding
mechanisms for the research institutes were changed.  On the one hand, the majority
of research funding would now come from the PMO.  On the other hand, research
funding was to be increasingly distributed on a competitive contract basis.39
Officially, the rationale for severing the ties between the ministries and their
respective research organisations was to remove the possibility of bias in the
formulation of policies (which was assumed to have played a part in facilitating the
crisis). While several interviews confirmed that the links between the research
institutes and the ministries had been weakening, anyway, during the 1990s, the
restructuring does not seem to have consummated this trend by completely de-linking
the research institutes from the ministries. A common view from both policy-makers
and researchers is that the former system still operates, albeit at an informal level. The
ministries still remain the primary recipient of policy outputs of their former research
institutes and in practice still provide the guidelines for policy research.  The problem
now is that with the duplication of institutional management (having to report to two
'masters'), the work load of the research institutes has increased without a
compensatory growth in staff numbers.
While it seems clear that the government's institutional responses to the crisis have
not fragmented the economic bureaucracy, it does appear that the policy-making
process may now be more contested within the bureaucracy - as a result of internecine
competition between the various agencies - and thus less coherent than was previously
the case.  Attesting to these developments, the coordinating role of the Deputy Prime
Minister was revived in 2001.40
Developments in civil society
In the wake of the crisis there is evidence of growing rifts between the organisations
of civil society. For instance, the Citizen’s Coalition for Economic Justice, once the
largest of the NGOs and the first to pursue social welfare concerns, appears to have
lost ground to the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy. Currently the
largest NGO (with over 13,400 members and an annual budget of 1.8 billion won 41),
the PSPD mobilises around social welfare from an opposing position to the CCEJ.
While responses from PSPD staff downplay the extent of the rivalry, claiming that the
two organisations work in different areas, there has been public opposition to
increased social welfare expenditure by some CCEJ executives. This contrasts with
PSPD support for increases in welfare expenditure.
If the principal NGOs mobilising around social welfare do not speak to the
government with a coherent voice, neither does organised labour. Our interviews
suggest that the historic ideological and political differences between the Federation
                                                
39 For instance, the Korea Rural Economic Institute, once under the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA),
now receives 50 percent of its funding from the PMO, 25 percent from MOA contracts, and 25 percent
from projects initiated by other ministries.
40 Unlike the previous structure, the coordinating role of the DPM is now filled by two individuals,
namely, the Minister for Education and Human Resources as well as by the Minister of Finance and
Economy.
41 About 957,000 GBP or 1.36 million USD.
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of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) and the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions
remain and that the experiences of economic crisis seem to have done little to alter the
situation. While particular issues sometimes result in a 'common front', for the most
part mutual distrust prevents the coherent response to business and government policy
that might otherwise have been anticipated.
The rifts between civil society, more generally, and the government that were
moderated in the early years of democratisation, also re-emerged after the crisis.
Initially, however, the experiments in social dialogue of the 1990s were extended in
1998 when the KCTU was invited, for the first time, to participate in the new
Tripartite Commission on collective bargaining (Lee and Lee 2000). 42 After three
weeks of negotiations, a compromise was reached; the government promised to create
a workplace council for civil servants and to allow teachers to unionise.  They
promised to improve union rights and to give unions full rights to participate in
political activity.  Furthermore, the government also promised to spend more on
unemployment and social welfare.  In return, the unions accepted a new redundancy
system, effectively endorsing the government’s longstanding goal to increase labour
market flexibility in the chaebol.
Notwithstanding this apparent success, however, evidence suggests that the strength
of the social dialogue has been both limited and ephemeral.  In the latter half of 1998,
labour disputes erupted over the restructuring of the banking and corporate sectors. In
early 1999, both labour federations withdrew from the Tripartite Commission and in
May of that year the Seoul Subway Union initiated a week-long walkout in protest
over public sector reform.  While the agreements reached by the Tripartite
Commission were passed into law, interviews with both government and trade union
officials suggest that social dialogue has effectively come to a halt.
4. ANALYSIS: ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND POVERTY
Given that official statistical accounts suggest that the economic and social impact of
the crisis has been contained by the Kim Dae Jung administration, this suggests that
government reforms have been successful in balancing economic and social needs in
the recovery effort.  Indeed, the recovery in the country has been much more rapid
than has been the case in regional neighbours – Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia.
Furthermore, this has been achieved in the context of South Korea’s first explicit
attempts at poverty reduction.  Accordingly, in this section, we discuss South Korea’s
evolving institutions of economic governance in order to understand their relationship
to social welfare policies in general and to poverty alleviation in particular.
The poverty counter-measures initiated under the Kim Dae Jung administration were
two-fold and, by South Korean standards, they represent a radical shift in policy.
They involved reforms to the social insurance system and the development of social
assistance programmes.43  In terms of poverty reduction, the most notable reform in
                                                
42 Yet as one KCTU member remarked, both the FKTU and the Korea Employer’s Federation had full
access to negotiation meetings in the social dialogue council while the KCTU did not.
43 See Kim, Y.M. (2001) for further details.
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social insurance concerned the Employment Insurance System (EIS).44  The
government resisted efforts by MOFE to privatise parts of the system (a continuation
of pursuits initiated under the previous administration).  Rather, the government chose
to preserve the public management structure, expand its coverage, increase benefits,
and introduce labour market measures previously unknown in South Korea.  For
instance, coverage was expanded to all wage-earning employees including non-
standard workers (ie. temporary and part-time workers).  By 2000, the EIS covered
55.1 percent of the workforce, compared with only 33.1 percent in late 1997
However, despite this extension in coverage, no more than 11 percent of the
unemployed population received unemployment benefits at the peak of the crisis in
1999 (Park et al 2001). Alongside increases in the level of benefit and allowance
period, the government also introduced new forms of active labour market
programmes, such as job training, as well as more traditional 'passive' measures such
as unemployment payments.45
Beyond reforms to the social insurance system, the development of social safety nets
targeting those hardest hit by the economic crisis (the poor and unemployed), were
more significant anti-poverty measures. The government, for instance, temporarily
increased the funds given to job training for the unemployed, loans for the jobless to
secure a livelihood, and temporary livelihood protection programmes for the poor.  In
1999, the government allocated over 4,365.4 billion Won (then about £2.36 billion) or
59.5 percent of the total unemployment budget to these four programmes. By 2000,
conditions were improving with official unemployment levels declining dramatically
from a high of 8.4 percent in the first quarter of 1999, to 5.1 percent at the start of
2000 and 3.7 percent by the end of the year (see Figure 4).  The government curtailed
these safety net expenditures in 2000, reducing their budgetary allocation by 45
percent to 2,410 billion won (then about £1.3 billion), as well as discontinuing the
temporary livelihood protection programme.
While the social safety nets introduced immediately after the crisis were only
conceived of as a temporary response, in line with World Bank recommendations, the
government did enact a lasting institutional reform of the social insurance system.  In
October 2000, the government overhauled existing laws and established the National
Basic Livelihood Security law (NBLS).  Reforms focused primarily on two aspects:
eligibility requirements and conditionalities.  Firstly, the government repealed the
existing eligibility requirement which had formerly excluded those between 18 and 65
years of age as well as individuals, or any age other than children, who were able to
                                                
44 Given the dramatic rise in unemployment, reform in the employment insurance system was
particularly important for poverty reduction.  Yet to differing degrees, each pillar of the social
insurance system was reformed under the Kim Dae Jung administration.  For instance, modest reforms
to the pension system attempted to expand coverage to the entire population by introducing schemes
for the urban self-employed.  This improved pension coverage from 43.7 percent in 1997 to 75.8
percent of the economically active population in 1999 (Yang 2000).  On the other hand, the most
extensive reform efforts were targeted on the Health Insurance System. Along with a slight extension to
the scope of health insurance benefits, the government attempted an ambitious merger of over 420
health insurance societies - each independently managed and having different contribution rates - into a
single, publicly-managed insurance plan with a nationally unified contribution rate.  Yet reports from
some trade union officials claim that these reforms were a 'disaster' and reform debates have since
focussed on the development of private health insurance since 90 percent of hospitals are already
privately owned.
45 'Traditional', that is, for other countries. Although active labour market policies were first introduced
after the crisis, passive measures have continued to receive higher budgetary allocations.
28
work (ie. the vast majority of the population).  Under the new law, eligibility was
limited only by income level and value of assets.  At present, this means anyone
earning less than 260,000 won per month (roughly £138), and who possesses less than
30 million won in assets (roughly £16,000), is covered under the NBLS.  Secondly the
government introduced 'workfare' conditionalities into the livelihood protection
system.  Given drastic increases in public expenditure for the poor following the crisis
(see Table 4), Korea’s economic agencies and especially the Ministry of Planning and
Budget, insisted on conditionalities requiring able-bodied claimants to participate in
job training or self-support programmes.46
Table 4: Livelihood Protection Budget (1996–1999)
1996 1997 1998 1999
Absolute
Budget
3,606 4,357 5,749 11,353
Rate of
Increase
- 20.8 31.9 97.5
(unit: hundred million Won, %)
Source: PSPD (2000)
In summary, the Kim Dae-Jung administration initiated Korea’s first concerted
attempts to tackle poverty and income inequality through a rapid expansion of social
expenditures coupled with developments in the social protection system.
Furthermore, his government advanced the idea of 'Productive Welfare' as a new
macro-economic framework in which social welfare and poverty were to be key
considerations in economic management (discussed further in section 4.2).  Indeed,
the priority now given to poverty-related issues by economic managers is underlined
by the fact that some of these policy issues have been raised - and proposals made -
within the main coordinating forum for the economic bureaucracy: the economic
policies coordination meeting of the 'Blue House'.
Yet while advances in poverty reduction and welfare policy-making have emerged
alongside recent developments in economic governance (at times emerging from the
economic bureaucracy itself), the link between economic governance and poverty in
contemporary Korea, is not as straightforward as it may at first seem.  In order to
show how and why this is the case, we need to consider arrangements from an earlier
period in South Korea's system of economic governance.
4.1 The Economic Planning Board as welfare's 'relative' ally
Following the introduction of South Korea’s 'Globalisation Policy' in late 1994, as
indicated earlier, the then President, Kim Young Sam, authorised the merger of the
                                                
46 While reflecting the ‘neo-liberal’ orientation of many in the economic bureaucracy, the use of
conditionalities in National Basic Livelihood Standards Act is less stringent than workfare policies in
the US context (cf. Kim, Y.M. 2001 and Peck 2001).  For instance, under the U.S. Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, recipients are required to enter the
workforce within two years and end assistance within five years.  Furthermore, the NBLS introduced
self-support programmes as a complement to workfare programmes.
29
Economic Planning Board into the Ministry of Finance (MOF).  Crucially, by
removing control over economic planning from EPB heads and transferring it to MOF
directors, Korea abruptly shifted from a planning to a finance-driven form of
economic governance.  Evidence suggests that the introduction of Segyehwa
('globalisation policy') and associated reforms effectively marginalised the support for
the development of social welfare programmes that had been emerging from within
the economic bureaucracy.47
Unlike the MOF, the EPB had always operated with a much wider remit than
economic policy per se.48  Indeed, it played an important role in the development of
the early versions of the social protection system and was active in the formulation
and implementation of social policy more generally.49  The development of the
Employment Insurance System, initiated in 1995, was a case in point and it is worth
exploring in some detail.
It seems that the EPB was the first government agency to recognise the need for
unemployment insurance in the early 1970s (Yoo 1999), but it was not until the early
1990s that opposition to the idea, from elsewhere in the government apparatus, was
overcome.  With support from the Ministry of Labor, the EPB publicly acknowledged
the necessity for an employment insurance system as part of its 7th Five Year Plan
(1992-1997).50  At the time, this initiative was opposed by other economic agencies,
such as the Ministry of Commerce, as well as influential organisations such as the
Korea Employers Federation (KEF).  These groups argued that there was little to
warrant a policy initiative that would increase the financial burden on firms
(especially small and medium sized enterprises) given that the unemployment rate had
fallen to 2.3 percent by 1991 and had been declining for over a decade (see Figure 4).
                                                
47 This can be seen from the structure of the new Ministry of Finance and Economy, which did not
incorporate the social development planning division of the EPB when it absorbed the latter.
48 The involvement of South Korea’s economic managers in social policy formulation appears to have
stemmed, at least in part, from executive decisions.  President Park’s appointment of the Minister of
Social Welfare to the head the EPB in the late 1970s was one important development in this sense.
With the rise of the Chun administration (1980–1986) following the assassination of Park in October
1979, the government was faced with the task of balancing both economic and military interests.  The
military, through the National Security Council, began to promote the idea of building a welfare state
as a way of legitimating military rule, while the larger goal of economic development continued to be
promoted by Chun’s closest economic advisors  (Kwon 1999).  It appears that the solution taken by
Chun was to invest a greater degree of control over social policy formulation in his economic
managers, thus merging efforts to develop a semblance of a welfare state (it was never intended to be
more than that) with a renewed focus of economic development.  Ultimately, while the support for
building a welfare state soon dissipated as military rhetoric changed tack, the EPB continued to pursue
the social welfare 'project'; a role that the EPB would retain until the elimination of its autonomy.
49 This is not to detract attention from the overarching fact that throughout the developmental era,
advances in social welfare have always emerged from Presidential initiatives to gain legitimacy for
their newly-elected administrations (Kwon 1999). While the role of the President has been paramount
in supporting social welfare, the EPB often took ultimate responsibility for the administration of social
welfare programmes and participated in their actual design.  Indeed, on occasion, it took Presidential
intervention to prevent the EPB from taking responsibility for social welfare programmes. The control
of the health insurance programme of 1975 (when President Park sided with the Minister of Health and
Social Affairs against the interests of the EPB) was a case in point (Kwon 1999: 57).
50 As in state-socialist societies, South Korea (and indeed, Taiwan) organised its economic planning in
terms of a series of five year plans, each of them emphasizing (hence organising the development effort
in support of) particular strategic initiatives (textiles, heavy industry, chemicals etc.).
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Interview responses from one of the designers of the EIS confirmed that unlike the
Ministry of Finance, which had barely been engaged in its formulation, the EPB's
authority, even in matters of social policy-making, allowed it to 'nose-in' on a number
of issues - even technical ones - that were strictly the preserve of the Ministry of
Labor.
The EPB’s efforts in developing the EIS, arose in part from concerns about the likely
impact on employment of the collapse of labour-intensive industries such as shoes,
rubber, and textiles in the early 1990s. Additionally, however, it wished to circumvent
an alternative Ministry of Labor plan to introduce an 'employment adjustment subsidy'
which the EPB considered to be harmful to its wider interests in managing the need
for industrial restructuring. The EPB's proposals ultimately triumphed against the
opposition of the Ministries of Commerce and the KEF when support from the
President ensured that proposals to develop the EIS were incorporated in the 'New
Economy' Five-Year Plan announced in mid 1993.
Figure 4: Unemployment Rate: Korea 1970 - 2000
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While the role of the EPB in designing the Employment Insurance System was clearly
affected by changing political sentiments under the Kim Young Sam administration,
its historic engagement in social policy areas was not altogether surprising given its
own organisational history and intellectual culture. As early as the mid 1970s, Korea’s
economic planners had become interested in including social welfare analysis in their
remit.51 While concerns over income distribution became an important issue for the
economic planners, due to the rapid growth and concentration of wealth in the
chaebol, their attempts to integrate economic and social analysis also reflected the
background and thinking of key individuals within the EPB itself.
For instance, interviews with former EPB officials confirmed that while economists
sympathetic to social welfare initiatives were in the minority among EPB staff, its
                                                
51 As a former official recalled, the EPB often considered that data from the GINI co-efficient (which
measures income inequality) to be one of the most important sources of evidence for the analysis and
formulation of economic policy.
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social planning division did foster a number of individuals with both specialised
training and a genuine interest in advancing social welfare alongside economic
development. When political sentiments were supportive, individuals receptive to
social welfare concerns were able to take key positions within the EPB. One case in
point occurred in the mid 1970s when Shin Hyun Hwak became head of the EPB.
Coming from his previous post as Minister for Social Welfare, his appointment was
an important political gesture when the country was in the midst of a drive for
economic growth.  Indeed, in his new capacity, it appears that Shin was instrumental
in getting the 'social' dimension incorporated into the very name of the 4th Five-Year
Plan in 1977 which was entitled, the ‘Economic and Social Development Plan’.52
With the invocation of the 'globalisation policy' in 1994 and the expulsion of long-
term planning from the core of national economic management, the experience in, and
receptiveness to, social concerns by the economic managers appears to have
dissipated along with social welfare’s 'relative ally' in the economic bureaucracy: the
EPB. An important reason for this was an important sub-text to the merger of the EPB
and the Ministry of Finance: their oft-remarked intellectual rivalry.  Being the more
progressive economic agency, the EPB was often pitted against the longstanding
conservatism of the MOF.  Indeed, interviews suggest that South Korea’s financial
managers had previously resisted two attempts by the EPB to send teams into the
MOF to transform their economic conservatism. Once the MOF's had absorbed the
EPB, the former's conservatism was secure. 53
4.2 Social welfare in a global era: implications of a finance-driven
economic bureaucracy
Historically, all four ‘pillars’ making up South Korea's present social insurance
system, were developed under the EPB (the last of these being the Employment
Insurance System enacted in 1995).  In the years following the EPB's demise and the
creation of the Ministry of Finance and Economy in 1995, the institutional structure
for co-ordinating economic and social policy has changed. It now effectively
marginalises social considerations. For example, social welfare inputs from agencies
such as the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs are not a feature (nor ever were) of
the Economic Ministers' Committee and as one senior official confirmed,
representatives of the social welfare ministries are rarely invited to its meetings.54
                                                
52 Reports from some former EPB officials confirmed that while the name change did reflect changes in
the ideas and analysis being used in economic planning, it did not signify a major policy turn or in the
relative prioritisation of social policy vis-à-vis economic policy. Furthermore, other respondents
reported that the name change reflected the fact that many social welfare initiatives were already in the
planning stage and the title of the 4th Five-Year Plan merely reflected these developments.
53 While many EPB officials, at this point, left for other civil service posts - particularly in the research
institutes - there were notable exceptions. For instance, one senior official, Lee Ki-Oh became both the
Economic Secretary in the Blue House as well as the Minister of Finance and Economy (considered the
two most powerful positions in economic policy-making). The present Deputy Minister in the MOFE is
also a former EPB official.
54 Standing members of the economic committee include the heads of the Ministry of Planning and
Budget, the Financial Supervisory Commission, the Ministry of Finance and Economy, the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry, the economic secretary in the Blue House, and the Chief economic advisor to
the President.  Unlike the other social ministries, the Ministry of Labor is often present in the economic
coordination meetings, signifying the importance that labour issues have acquired following the crisis.
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Similarly, even within the Blue House, the social secretariat is not linked to the
economic secretariat and they pursue their respective remits in relative isolation from
one another. While the EPB previously co-ordinated economic and social policy-
making, any routine co-ordination that now exists seems to arise primarily in
negotiations over the budget. Whereas welfare issues, certainly from at least the mid
1970s, had a presence in minds of economic policy-makers (though it is important not
to over-stress its significance for them), now it appears that it has largely been
exorcised from the concerns of their successors.
When attempting to evaluate the poverty counter-measures pursued after the financial
crisis, one must first recognise that the government’s pre-crisis 'social safety net' was
minimal.  Korea had historically pursued the development of a social security system
and not a safety net.  By the beginning of the crisis, the formal social protection
system was comprised of a minimal social insurance system, supported by a
livelihood protection system that provided stipends to the aged, poor and
incapacitated along with rudimentary social welfare services.55  Consequently, post-
crisis efforts to build a more comprehensive social safety net represented, amongst
other things, a change in the very language of Korean social policymaking.56 As much
as anything else, this reflected the government’s need to adopt the social welfare
lingua franca of the international community, following its acceptance of financial aid
from the World Bank in 1998.57
With the crisis and the rapid growth of unemployment to unprecedented levels, the
government was clearly pressed to come up with a swift solution. Interview responses
from policy experts - and, indeed, from some officials - confirmed that the
government's response was inadequate. This was largely because of a glaring lack of
attention - and appropriate resource commitments - to building the capacity (in terms
of personnel and services) that was required to implement anti-poverty strategies.58 If
these reports are accurate, then mo st of the new welfare policies pursued after the
crisis must have resulted in much wasted expenditure given the absence of an
appropriate institutional capacity for implementing the policies.
For instance, as one respondent indicated, the application of those aspects of the social
safety net that could not be administered routinely according to simple criteria (the
                                                                                                                                           
As well as the formal economic coordination meetings, which currently occur about every two weeks,
there are often bi-weekly informal discussions on economic affairs.
55 One senior Korean official indicated that when the IMF analysed the country's social safety net in the
late 1990s, they concluded that it provided about two-thirds of the average support levels of the US and
UK (which have among the less generous levels of provision in the advanced economies) but far below
the levels of the Scandinavian countries.
56 While social safety nets are used by the IMF and the World Bank to refer to temporary cash or in-
kind transfer programmes for the poor and unemployed, in Korea the term does not necessarily refer to
poverty counter-measures.  Rather, it tends to encompass all forms of social protection and welfare
(Kim, Y.M. 2001).
57 World Bank Structural Adjustment loans require that government efforts meet at least one of three
criteria: the reallocation of public expenditures in favour of the poor; the elimination of distortions and
regulations that disadvantage the poor and limit their income-generating opportunities; and/or the
development of social safety nets that protect the most vulnerable members of the population.
58 The workload for welfare officers in Korea is much higher than in most OECD countries.  For
instance, recent estimates place the average caseload-to-staff ratio in Korea at roughly 280 cases per
social worker, compared with averages between 60 and 100 in Belgium and Norway or against ranges
of 80 to 120 in the Netherlands and Switzerland (OECD, 2000).
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level of administrative capacity and duties that had developed under the existing
system of social insurance), was severely constrained because of limitations in terms
of manpower, training and restrictions on the exercise of authority.  In practice, this
meant that certain projects - public works for example - which require minimal
numbers of staff to process large numbers of simple applications - were reported to
have been more successful and better implemented than many of the new benefit
policies.  New benefit programmes often required significantly more staff to process
claims precisely because more complex forms of information-gathering and
monitoring were required to verify the financial situation of claimants.  Given that
more complex administrative procedures were unnecessary for the application of the
former social insurance system, and that the former system was never subject to the
level of claims seen during the economic crisis, the new ‘productive welfare’
programmes seem to have degenerated into welfare 'handouts' due to administrative
and logistical limitations. For instance, of the 1.5 million targeted beneficiaries under
the new National Basic Livelihood Security System in 2000, roughly 1.1 million (75
percent) were immediately classified as unable to work, thus receiving financial
support with no conditions attached.  Of the 381,000 beneficiaries that were classified
as able to work, only about 4 percent (60,000) of the total target population were
ultimately given benefits with some 'productive welfare' conditionality (MOL 2000).
The capacity to deliver means-tested social benefits involving claimant
conditionalities could not be created overnight.
As the NBLS case illustrates, much of the social safety net established after the crisis
may have become, in effect, welfare disbursements.  Despite policy rhetoric and the
incorporation of active labour market conditionalities into the livelihood protection
system, many policies have not been given adequate attention in terms of the
capacity-building needed to effectively administer the new and expanded
programmes.  One important reason for this outcome may lie in how the institutions
of economic governance have evolved over the 1990s.
Whereas South Korea’s economic managers had once played an important and at
times proactive role in social welfare, available evidence suggests that this is no
longer the case.  Rather, under the current Kim Dae Jung administration, social
welfare developments appear to have been driven by the President with little support
(and, surprisingly for Korea, with some resistance) from many in the economic
bureaucracy. The predominant role of the President in post-crisis social welfare
reform becomes clear when attention is given to the institutional development of the
notion of 'productive welfare'.
In late 1998, newly-elected President, Kim Dae Jung, asked  Kim Yoo-Bae, then the
Blue House presidential secretary for welfare and labour, to put together a small team
(the ‘Quality of Life Committee’) to develop the concept of productive welfare into a
policy platform.  Interestingly, this concept was reported to have first entered political
discourse in the earlier Kim Young Sam administration (1993-1997) after President
Kim Young Sam had attended the Copenhagen Summit in early 1995.59  Failing to
gain a consensus and political momentum, the concept remained at the fringe of
political discourse under the guise of 'balanced welfare' before re-emerging again as
                                                
59 In his recent book, Kim Dae Jung claims to have first come up with the notion of 'productive welfare
in the 1950s (Office of the President of the Republic of Korea, 2000).
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'productive welfare' towards the end of the 1990s.60  Furthermore, a number of
respondents confirmed that the concept, as before, was developed with relatively little
support or input from either members of the economic bureaucracy or even from the
major social welfare NGOs.61
Evidence suggests that efforts to establish the notion of productive welfare—itself
little understood and, if reports are correct, of little relevance to the day-to-day
activities of the bureaucrats—was a propaganda ploy by the new administration
designed to ease public opposition to the reforms (and their consequences for
unemployment) that would be needed to overcome the economic crisis. 62 Some
respondents also felt that the concept was intended as a political crisis-management
strategy. Specifically, they thought, it was aimed at appeasing opposition from those
in the economic bureaucracy who feared that Korea would succumb to the supposed
'welfare disease' that had slowed down rates of economic growth in Western nations.
Further underlining the primacy of the chief executive in advancing social welfare
after the crisis, opposition to Kim Dae Jung's attempts to expand the social safety net
extends beyond the economic bureaucracy.  The National Basic Livelihoods
Standards Act, passed in November 2000, is a case in point.  Attempts to update the
NBLS were opposed not just by many in the economic bureaucracy, but even by
senior officials in Ministry of Labor (MOL). As one respondent explained, the MOL
opposed efforts to upgrade the existing Livelihoods Protection System because labour
officials felt that government poverty counter-measures should place greater emphasis
on employment generation, emphasising individual self-reliance over government
welfare handouts.63  Given that in 1999, the budget for livelihood protection (which,
as mentioned above, effectively became a form of welfare handouts with little or
conditionalities attached) had risen to over 11 billion Won (then roughly £6m or
$9.6m) - an amazing 97.5 percent increase from levels in 1998 - this MOL concern
was understandable.
Resistance to social welfare developments, however, have not only come from within
the economic bureaucracy.  Some NGOs have opposed efforts to expand social
expenditures, clearly showing the divisions that have developed within civil society.
For instance, one senior member of the Citizen’s Coalition for Economic Justice, a
                                                
60 One of the key people involved in the historical development of Productive Welfare was Kyungbae
Chung, currently the President of the Korean Institute for Health and Social Affairs.  He has been
personally engaged in the development of the concept of “Balanced Welfare” for over ten years and
was himself a member of the President’s Blue House team on Productive Welfare.
61 While a few respondents suggested that NGOs such as the People’s Solidarity for Participatory
Democracy may have contributed to the development of productive welfare, interviews with PSPD
staff confirmed that this was not the case.
62 While this was the first time that a Korean President had officially outlined their plans for the
direction of welfare policy, many respondents felt that productive welfare lacked any relevance for
policymakers, nor did it have any concrete impact on social policy change. Kim YM (2001) describes
the concept as 'a hodgepodge of various different ideas ranging from state welfarism and neoliberalism
to the Third Way and welfare pluralism…', ultimately concluding that '…it does not seem an
appropriate research direction to try to identify the character of the DJ administration's social welfare
policy focusing on productive welfare.'
63 One important context to the MOL’s opposition the Livelihood Protection System was reported to be
a constraint of the IMF negotiations which only gave room for two policy options, public assistance or
employment measures. Not unsurprisingly then, the MOL argued for employment measures over public
assistance.
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civil organisation strongly supported by many academic economists, was reported to
have publicly opposed the policies pursued by Korea’s main social welfare NGO, the
People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, arguing that their attempts to
increase welfare expenditures would only be a waste of government funds.
Furthermore, the Bretton Woods agencies and their equivalents are often attributed
with influencing social welfare policies in neo-liberal directions (see Deacon 1997).
Yet we have found little evidence to suggest that their role in formulating and
directing social policies in South Korea was significant.  On the one hand, many
social welfare advocates in Korea have argued that the recent reforms are indeed neo-
liberal in orientation, using a number of industrial and labour policies as examples
(for instance, Kim and Bak 1998; Jang 1998).   While gaining headway under Kim
Young Sam’s globalisation policy, some argue that neo-liberalism has further
influenced policy-makers through the bailout conditionalities imposed by the Bretton
Woods institutions (eg. Pieper and Taylor 1998).   Against these claims, others have
argued that social welfare policies under Kim Dae Jung actually enhance the role of
the state in welfare provision rather than withdraw it from such functions (Kim, Y.M.
2001).64  Our research tends to support the latter argument, suggesting that Korea’s
internal governing dynamics have played a greater role is shaping social and
economic policy-making ideas and determining how, in practice, they are pursued.
Firstly, interview responses revealed a broad consensus affirming the claim that while
the Bretton Woods institutions have influenced social and economic policies in a
general sense, their level of influence was greatest during the developmental period of
the 1970s and early 1980s.65  By the mid 1980s, Korea’s balance of payments were
healthy and consultations with the international financial institutions were reported to
be declining.  Thus, with the exception of the economic crisis, international agencies
appeared to have played only a minor advisory role for the last decade.
Secondly, available evidence suggests that even during the 'IMF financial crisis' (as it
was often known in Korea), the internal dynamics of governance were a more
significant influence on the crisis-management efforts of the Kim Dae Jung
administration, than were the Bretton Woods institutions.  For instance, interviews
with senior officials in the economic bureaucracy suggested that the IMF bail-out in
1998 was not simply a matter of the IMF team insisting on particular structural and
policy reforms. Rather, it appears that the overwhelming majority of the IMF package
                                                
64 Similarly, many respondents interviewed felt that while the DJ government has certainly adopted
some western-style policies after the crisis, this does not simply mean that Korea has taken a neo-
liberal direction.  Rather, they felt that neo-liberalism has had historical and politically specific contexts
and situations to which western nations have responded which are different from the context in which
Korea has developed.  Thus, according to this view, Korea developmental trajectory is unique, as the
nation embarks upon its own model of a market economy guided by its own internal dynamics.
65 A period in which Korea had one of the highest levels of foreign indebtedness in the world. It should
be remembered, however, that the IMF was always far more 'lenient' with South Korea than it was with
other developing countries in the sense that it never subjected the country to the 'full-force' of neo-
liberalism. Part of the reason for this was that South Korea was highly successful in using foreign
borrowing for productive (rather than speculative) purposes and consequently had no problems
servicing its debt. Additionally, the US government was concerned to build South Korea as a 'bulwalk
against bolshevism' and consequently was less concerned than might otherwise have been the case, that
it was not following neo-liberal orthodoxy 'to the letter' (see Henderson 1993).
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(upwards of 90 percent) was actually prepared by Korea's own economic managers.66
Indeed, as others confirmed at interview, much of the crisis- management strategy
was already in place prior to the start of the IMF negotiations.  The government had
had difficulty implementing these reforms, however, because of resistance in
Parliament and from the chaebol. In addition to providing the bail-out loans, then, the
role of the IMF seems to have been to act largely as a powerful external agency to
legitimate the need for the pre-existing reform agenda.67
With regard to the World Bank at this time, both informed commentators (eg. Kim
YM 2001) and our interview evidence, suggests that the Bank's role was largely to
provide a discourse to connect pre-existing Korean ideas for welfare reform to
international practices, rather than to press such practices on to the South Korean
government. In the pursuit of 'productive welfare', policy directions have deviated, in
fact, from World Bank suggestions. Pension reform is a case in point.  As Kim (2001)
argues, World Bank recommendations for pension reform were very similar to those
that had been espoused by the Kim Young Sam administration in the mid 1990s. The
Kim Dae Jung administration, however, rejected these reform proposals, choosing
instead to launch a plan which preserved the basic framework of the existing pension
scheme. As a consequence, few of the neo-liberal elements recommended by the
World Bank were ultimately incorporated into the reform package.
Drawing on available evidence and from our own research, we conclude that the
progressive social policies pursued after the crisis, while developing in part from
high-level economic forums (such as the economic coordination meetings in the Blue
House), were not the outcome of progressive orientations from within the institutions
of economic governance.  Indeed, the majority of economists in the economic
bureaucracy, the government economic research institutes, and even the main
'economic' NGOs, appear to have opposed the kinds of social welfare reform
advocated by President Kim Dae Jung.  Rather, Korea’s recent (since 1998) pro-poor
initiatives seem to have resulted from Kim Dae Jung's personal interest in expanding
social welfare provision after the crisis.68
                                                
66 In total, the Korean government signed nine Letters of Intent with the IMF. The first five Letters
(beginning in December 1997) were broadly focussed on macroeconomic policy. At this stage in the
crisis, the main focus of the Korean government was on restoring the stability to the foreign exchange
markets and increasing foreign reserves.  To this effect, the IMF Letters of Intent merely stipulated
specific quarterly and annual macroeconomic targets which the government needed to meet. As the
foreign reserves reached substantial levels (from less than US$4 billion in December 1997 to US$64.0
billion by July 1999), the IMF programme shifted from general principles and macroeconomic targets,
to specific recommendations on structural reform.  Thus, only by the sixth Letter of Intent (May 1998),
were the first detailed restructuring measures - concerning the corporate sector - even mentioned in the
IMF package (Wang 1999).
67 One area in which the IMF may have been the primary progenitor of reforms was in the development
of the social dialogue.  In seeking a more flexible redundancy system in exchange for economic bail-
out, one interviewee confirmed that the Tripartite Commission was an IMF proposal (a view supported
by a number of policy experts we interviewed) which the government then advocated in negotiations
with labour interests over the Social Accord in early 1998.
68 Some authors have commented upon a 'triangular alliance' that was formed soon after
democratisation in the late 1980s between social policy advocates in the trade unions and NGOs on the
one hand, and Kim Dae Jung's then opposition party. (see, for instance, Yang 2000).  While these
organisations are purported to have helped to bring Kim Dae Jung to power, our research found little to
support the idea that there was a concerted ‘alliance’ between the Kim Dae Jung administration and his
Party and the two main NGO proponents of social welfare: the People’s Solidarity for Participatory
Democracy and the Korea Confederation of Trade Unions.
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This analysis leads us to raise some worrying conclusions about the current links
between economic governance and poverty in Korea.  Given the importance of the
economic bureaucracy in affecting the implementation of welfare policies (through
budgetary allocations, for instance), a system of economic governance that relies upon
the will of the chief executive to inject poverty counter-measures into Korea’s
macroeconomic strategy, may be both instrumentally problematic and ultimately very
fragile.  A highly centralised and executive-driven form of economic governance -
given Korea’s one term Presidential system - is likely to mean that the considerable
support required to integrate poverty concerns into the nation’s macro-economic
management strategy, cannot be sustained against what is now a conservative finance-
driven economic bureaucracy. The progressive momentum that Kim Dae Jung has
introduced is, in the future, likely to wane. If this does not result from the coming
change in the administration (with elections due in late 2002), then it may well result
from initiatives within the economic bureaucracy (who will be able to draw on
evidence that poverty levels have now fallen to pre-crisis levels), some of whom have
always believed that recent increases in expenditure are unnecessary, unsustainable
and ultimately detrimental to the Korean economy.
With the demise of the planning functions in the economic bureaucracy and the
consequent lack of a 'relative ally' receptive to social welfare concerns in the now
finance-dominated economic bureaucracy, coupled with the dependency on
Presidential support to place social welfare concerns at the forefront of macro-
economic management, Korea is faced with a problematic governing arrangement that
may ultimately work to compromise the effectiveness by which poverty counter-
measures are formulated and implemented.  If the only way to overcome the lack of
social welfare support from within the economic bureaucracy is through sheer
political will, then initiatives are likely to be rushed through the policy-making
process, formulated with insufficient debate and engendered with insufficient
institutional capacity to ensure effective implementation. As suggested above, this
indeed appears to have been the case with many new programmes aimed at mitigating
the social impact of the economic crisis.  Thus, while the more immediate problems in
implementing anti-poverty measures are clearly related to historical precedent and the
country's limited experience with and institutional capacity for social protection, they
also appear to be intimately linked to the particular institutional arrangements and
policymaking practices that has come to constitute economic governance in Korea.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We began this report by remarking that South Korea, from the 1970s through to the
late 1990s, was considered as an exemplary case where poverty reduction had been
achieved seemingly as a reflex of economic growth. Investigating a number of issues
that lay behind the way in which data on poverty and inequality were calculated in the
country, we raised doubts as to whether South Korea's record on these matters was as
good as has been claimed. If these doubts are legitimate, then it seems - at the very
least - disingenuous to use the South Korean case to bolster what are in effect
ideological beliefs about the automatic and positive effects on poverty stemming from
economic growth per se.
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Whatever the reality of South Korea's record on poverty and inequality, however, it is
clear that it was able to achieve one of the best performances, on these issues, of any
capitalist society, at least prior to the onset of economic crisis in 1997. Among the
reasons for this positive performance - and recognising that South Korea was never a
welfare state (even in the limited sense of Singapore or Hong Kong) - was the fact
that it had an economic governance structure that allowed for coherent and
authoritative economic planning that incorporated social welfare considerations.
With democratisation, and particularly during the Kim Young Sam administration
(1993-97), the growing flirtation with neo-liberal economics (for various reasons and
from various sources) resulted in the abandonment of strategic economic planning,
and with it, the marginalisation of concerns with inequality and social welfare within
the core economic bureaucracy.
More specifically, the restructuring of the economic bureaucracy over the 1990s—
first with the demise of the Economic Planning Board, the disappearance of the social
planning department, and the subsumption of some of the EPB functions within the
Ministry of Finance and Economy and second with the breakdown of that ministry in
1998—led to a decline in support in the economic bureaucracy for progressive, social
welfare ideas. While the issues of inequality and welfare forced their way onto the
government's agenda during the economic crisis (as a result of rising unemployment),
this effort was politically driven by the President and was not a 'normal' and thus
stable feature, of the country's system of economic governance.  As a consequence,
changes in the direction of social welfare initiated under the Kim Dae Jung
administration (1998-2002) may very well change with the election of a new
President in late 2002.
As in Korea’s authoritarian past, changes in the Presidency may mean that the driving
force in economic governance may again revert back to the point where the machinery
of government in general, and the economic bureaucracy in particular, take a larger
degree of control over policy-making processes.  If and when this happens, given the
concerns to deepen the alliance with the international financial 'community' and thus
its neo-liberal assumptions, the consideration of social welfare in general, and poverty
and income inequality in particular, may well revert back (albeit with 'new' neo-liberal
legitimations) to the situation in the authoritarian era when economic concerns were
given absolute priority over issues of welfare and social protection. In the final
analysis, the future direction that Korea takes with regards to economic governance
and poverty is likely to revolve around the ability for policy-makers and social
welfare advocates to significantly develop the notion of 'productive welfare' (or other
'third way' notions) through a broad based policy dialogue that can achieve consensus
and support by all those involved in economic governance.
REFERENCES
Amsden, A.H. (1989), Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization.
New York, Oxford University Press.
39
Appelbaum, R.P. and J. Henderson (1992) (eds.), States and Development in the
Asian Pacific Rim. Newbury Park, Sage Publications.
Castells, M. (1992), 'Four Asian tigers with a dragon head: a comparative analysis of
the state, economy and society in the Asian Pacific Rim'' in R.P. Appelbaum and
J. Henderson (eds.), States and Development in the Asian Pacific Rim. Newbury
Park, Sage Publications: 33-70.
Castells, M., L. Goh and R. Y-W. Kwok (1990), The Shek Kip Mei Syndrome:
Economic Development and Public Housing in Hong Kong and Singapore.
London, Pion.
Chang, H-J. (1994), The Political Economy of Industrial Policy. London, Macmillan.
Chang, H-J. (1998), 'Korea: the misunderstood crisis', World Development, 26(8):
1555-61.
Chang, H-J., H.J. Park and C. G. Woo (1998), 'Interpreting the Korean crisis:
financial liberalisation, industrial policy and corporate governance', Cambridge
Journal of Economics,
Cheng, T-J., S. Haggard and D. Kang, (1998), 'Institutions and growth in Korea and
Taiwan: the bureaucracy', Journal of Development Studies, 34(8): 87-111.
Cho, Hee-Yeon. (1993), Hyondae Hankuk Sahoe Wondong Kwa Chojik
(Contemporary Korean Society’s Social Movements and Organizations). Seoul:
Hanwul.
Cho, Yoon Je and Kim, Joon-Kyung. (1995), “Credit Policies and Industrialization of
Korea” World Bank Discussion Papers, No.286. Washington, D.C.
Choi, B.-S. (1991). "The Structure of the Economic Policy-Making Institutions in
Korea and the Strategic Role of the Economic Planning Board (EPB)". In Gerald
Caiden and Bun Woong Kim (eds): A Dragon's Progress: Development
Administration in Korea. West Hartford: Kumarian Press, pp 95-106.
Choi, Jang Jip. (1989), Labor and the Authoritarian State: Labor Unions in South
Korean Manufacturing Industries, 1961-1980.  Seoul: Korea University Press.
Choi, Y-K. (2000), "Social Dialogue and Economic Revivial in Korea". Paper
presented at an ILO international symposium on "Global Dialogue: Future
Works" in Hanover Germany, 4 October .
Choo, H. (1982), Estimation of Size Distribution of Income and Its Sources of
Changes on Korea, 1982, Working Paper 8515, Seoul, Korea Development
Institute.
Deacon, B. (1997), Global Social Policy: International Organisations and the Future
of Welfare. Sage, London.
40
Deyo, F.C. (1989), Beneath the Miracle: Labor Subordination in the New Asian
Industrialism. Berkeley, University of California Press.
Economic Planning Board. (1982), Kaebal Nyondae ui Kyungje Chongch’aek:
Kyongje Kihoekwon 20 Nyunsa (Economic Policies of the Development Era:
The Twenty Year History of the Economic Planning Board). Seoul: Economic
Planning Board.
Evans, P. and J. Rauch (1999), 'Bureaucracy and growth: a cross-national analysis of
the effects of "Weberian" state structures on economic growth', American
Sociological Review, 64(4): 748-65.
Henderson, J (1993), 'The role of the state in the economic transformation of East
Asia' in C. Dixon and D. Drakakis-Smith (eds.), Economic and Social
Development in Pacific Asia. London, Routledge.
Henderson, J. (1999), 'Uneven crises: institutional foundations of East Asian
economic turmoil', Economy and Society, 28(3):
Henderson, J., D. Hulme, R. Phillips and N. Ainur (2002), 'Economic governance and
poverty in Malaysia', Working Paper, Manchester Business School.
Jain, S. (1975) Size Distribution of Income: A Compilation of Data, Washington D.C.,
World Bank.
Jang, Sang-hwan. (1998), "Kim Dae-jung jeonggwon gyeongje jeongchaek-ui
seonggyeok-gwa jeonmang" (Character and Prospects for the Kim Dae-jung
Administration), Gyeongje-wa sahoe (Economy and Society) 38. Hanguk
saneop sahoe hakhoe (Korea Industrial Sociology Society).
Jeon, Y.-D.  and Kim, Y.-Y. (2000). "Land Reform, Income Redistribution, and
Agricultural Production in Korea". Economic Development and Cultural
Change 48(2): 253-268.
Kim, E.M. (1997), Big Business, Strong State: Collusion and Conflict in South
Korean Development, 1960-1990. Albany, State University of New York Press.
Kim, Eun Mee. (1998), “Socioeconomic Development in South Korea,” in Two
Koreas in Transition, edited by Ilpyong J. Kim. Rockville, MD: In Depth
Books.
Kim, Eun Mee, Kim, Joon-Kyung and Kim, Jun-Il. (2000), Restructuring of the
Chaebols and Financial Sector in Korea: Progress and Assessment Since the
Financial Crisis.  Working Paper Series Vol. 2000-23. ICSEAD: Kitakyushu.
Kim, Gyun, and Bak Sun-seong. (1998), "Kim Dae-jung jeongbu-ui gyeongje
jeongchaek-gwa sinjayujuui" (Kim Dae-jung Government's Economic Policy
and Neoliberalism), in Wigi, geurigo daejeonhwan: saeroun hanguk gyeongje-ui
paereodaim-eul chajaseo (Crisis and A Paradigm Shift: Looking for a New
41
Paradigm for Korean Economy), edited by Yi Byeong-cheon and Kim Gyun.
Seoul: Dangdae Publishing Co.
Kim, H-R. (2000a), "Korea's Economic Governance in Transition: Governance Crisis
and the Future of Korean Capitalism" 31(4): 553-577.
Kim, H-R. (2000b), "The state and civil society in transition: the role of non-
governmental organizations in South Korea". The Pacific Review 13(4): 595-
613.
Kim, Y-M. (2001), 'Welfare State or Social Safety Nets ? : Development of the Social
Welfare Policy of the Kim Dae-Jung Administration', Korea Journal, 41(2):
169-201.
Koh, G. (1997), 'Bureaucratic rationality in an evolving developmental state:
challenges to governance in Singapore', Asian Journal of Political Science, 5(2):
114-41.
Kwon, H.-J. (1999), The Welfare State in Korea. London, Macmillan.
Kwon, Soonwon (1998), "The Korean experience of poverty reduction: lessons and
prospects" in KDI/UNDP Poverty Alleviation. (EDAP Joint Policy Studies No.
8) Seoul, Korea Development Institute, pp. 29-45.
Lee, Y.-H. (2000), "The failure of the weak state in economic liberalization:
liberalization, democratization and the financial crisis in South Korea" 13(1):
115-131.
Lee, W.-D.  and Lee, B.-H. (2000), "Korean Industrial Relations in the Era of
Globalization". Paper was presented at the conference 2001 Asian and Pacific
Forum Industrial Relations: Globalization and the Transformation of Industrial
Relations, held in Taipei on September 27-28.
Mardon, Russell. (1990), “The State and the Effective Control of Foreign Capital: The
Case of South Korea.” World Politics 43:111-38.
Martellaro, J. (1989), “South Korea and Taiwan: A Comparative Analysis of the
Generation and Distribution of Income”, Rivista Internazionale de Scienze
Economiche e Commerciali, Vol. 36, No.12.
Ministry of Labor (2000). “Labor Administration”. International Cooperation Office,
Ministry of Labor, Seoul.
OECD (2000), Pushing Ahead with Reform in Korea: Labour Market and Social
Safety-net Policies. OECD.
Office of the President of the Republic of Korea (2000). DJ Welfarism: A New
Paradigm for Productive Welfare in Korea, Office of the President, Presidential
Committee for Quality of Life, Seoul.
42
Ogle, George E. (1990), South Korea: Dissent within the Economic Miracle. London:
Zed Books.
Park, F., Park, Y-B. , Betcherman, G. and Dar, A. (eds) (2001), Labor Market
Reforms in Korea: Policy Options for the Future. Seoul: Korea Labor Institute.
Park, N.-H. (2001), "Poverty Rate and Poverty Line in Korea". Conference Paper,
Philippine Institute for Development Studies, April.
Park, W.-A. (1996), "Financial Liberalization: The Korean Experience". In Takatoshi
Ito and Anne Kreuger (eds): Financial Deregulation and Integration in East
Asia. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp 247-276.
Peck, J. (2001), Workfare States. New York, Guilford Press.
Pieper, Ute, and Lance Taylor. (1998), "The Revival of the Liberal Creed: The IMF,
the World Bank, and Inequality in a Globalized Economy," in Globalization and
Progressive Economic Policy, edited by Dean Baker et al. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
PSPD/UNDP (2000), Poverty Status and Monitoring of Korea in the Aftermath of the
Financial Crisis. People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy and the United
Nations Development Programme. PSPD/UNDP.
Rauch, J. and Evans, P. (2000), "Bureaucractic structures and bureaucratic
performance in less developed countries". Journal of Public Economics 75(1):
49-71.
Rodan, G. (1989), The Political Economy of Singapore's Industrialisation. London,
Macmillan.
Schiffer, J. (1991), 'State policy and economic growth: a note on the Hong Kong
model', International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 15(2): 180-96.
Song, Ho Kun. (1991), Hanguk ui Nodong Chongchi wa Sijang (Labor Politics and
Market in South Korea). Seoul: Nanam.
Strange, S. (1998), Mad Money. Manchester, Manchester University Press.
UNDP (2000), Human Development Report 2000, New York and Oxford, Oxford
University Press.
Wang, Y. (1999), Restructuring and the Role of International Financial Institutions:
A Korean View. Working Paper. 99-11 Korean Institute for International
Economic Policy.
Whitley, R. (1992), Business Systems in East Asia. London, Sage Publications.
Woo, J-E. (1991), Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization.
New York, Columbia University Press.
43
World Bank (1999), World Development Report 1999/2000: Entering the 21st
Century, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press.
World Bank (2000), World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty, New
York and Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Yang, J-J. (2000), "The Rise of the Korean Welfare State amid Economic Crisis,
1997-99: Implications for the globalisation debate". Development Policy Review
18(3): 235-256.
Yoo, K. (1999), The Employment Insurance System in Korea. Soeul: Korea Labour
Institute.
Yoon, S.B. (2000). "Regional Income Distribution in South Korea". Journal of the
Asia Pacific Economy 5(1/2): 57-72.
Zysman, J. (1983), Governments, Markets and Growth. New York, Oxford University
Press.
44
Appendix I: Abbreviations
ALRAA Agricultural and Land Reform Amendment Act
CCEJ Citizen’s Coalition for Economic Justice
CSS Committee for Social Security
DMB Deposit Money Banks
EIS Employment Insurance System
EPB Economic Planning Board
FKTU Federation of Korean Trade Unions
KIHASA Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs
KCTU Korean Confederation of Trade Unions
KDI Korea Development Institute
KEF Korean Employer’s Federation
IMF International Monetary Fund
IRRC Industrial Relations Reform Commission
MCI Ministry of Commerce and Industry
MCL Minimum Cost of Living
MITI Ministry of International Trade and Industry
MOA Ministry of Agriculture
MOF Ministry of Finance
MOFE Ministry of Finance and Economy
MOGAHA Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs
MOL Ministry of Labor
MPB Ministry of Planning and Budget
NBFI Non-Banking Financial Institutions
NBLS National Basic Livelihood Security
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NSO National Statistics Office
PSPD People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy
